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Central Eurasia
SUPPLEMENT

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U.S. Said Trying To Exclude Russia From Mideast Affairs

954Q0133A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Vadim Markushin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA commentator: "The Right to It's Own Game: Russia Has It in the Middle East, but It Is Encountering Increasing Resistance From the United States in This Connection"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Americans do not like it at all that the Russian nuclear industry is going to help the Iranians build nuclear power plants. The State Department continues to express "deep concern" over this matter and to offer reminders about the possible reduction of American aid programs to Russia. Such a distressed reaction is qualified over there as a "protest in principle" against equipping the "world's largest sponsor of terrorism" with nuclear technology.

The concern, it is asserted, is a $1-billion contract under which the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy will install a 1-million-kilowatt reactor in [Bushira]. Such a deal violates neither the spirit nor the letter of the Treaty on International Control Over the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Technology, since no one is forbidden to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Washington, of course, knows that perfectly well. However, it prefers to act according to the well-known "Indian scenario." Yet it itself is promising to supply a similar nuclear reactor to North Korean, which has never been on the American list of "respectable countries."

The dual standard again. Precisely. What is supposedly permitted to Washington is not to Moscow, which, according to a table of ranks quietly "refined" in the West, can no longer allow itself "imperial manners." Evidently that is particular true beyond its southern horizon. For it is there, in a region of traditionally subtle intrigues and keen competition, that anyone else's slightest success is a motive for jealous pretensions on the part of other powers who keep a keen eye on the course of affairs there: and why not us?

In this sense Iran is in the United States' reserve account—as a country that with which it had close relations until the Islamic revolution, which gave rise to an outburst of anti-Americanism. By subjecting the Teheran regime to ostracism today and showing a determination to rein in Islamic radicalism, American political strategists are hardly allowing any hope to remain of restoring the past. They realize that Muslim fanaticism, like everything else that is human, is subject to a process of winding down. That the pendulum will inevitably swing in the opposite direction, and the revolutionary enthusiasm aroused by Ayatollah Khomeini will ultimately be replaced by the Persians' purely secular inclinations. And then the preferential opportunities for friendship will belong to those who have not made the development of business cooperation directly dependent on the nature of the ruling ideology at a given moment.

The Americans have never forgotten that Iran is the second country in the world in gas production and fourth in petroleum extraction, and that it occupies a key strategic space on the approaches to the Indian Ocean. That is why, soon after the American Embassy personnel who had been taken hostage in Teheran were freed in 1979, Washington eased restrictions on trade with Iran. Some companies promptly took advantage of that, and American computers, electronic equipment and other such products started moving to the Iranian market, demonstrating more vividly than any words the signs of American presence in the country.

On the scale of the region as a whole, Washington regards that sort of presence as a kind of given, as a natural factor of Middle Eastern development. Yet for some reason it considers Russian efforts of the same sort to be unnatural. Although Russia has long had strong bonds with the countries located there, bonds which have loosened only during a few relatively brief periods, including the years of Soviet perestroyka.

Having defined for itself the former Soviet Union's Afghan epic as a historical failure to break through to the Indian Ocean, it seems that even now Washington is inclined to attribute all of Moscow's subsequent attempts to become more active in that region to the inertia of its previous imperial behavior. The Iraqi example is perhaps the most vivid here. Vivid in that here, once again, the success of Russian peacekeeping diplomacy has produced an envious echo in American ruling circles, which quickly figured that Saddam Hussein is not eternal and that it would be unforgivable to "give away" such an object of influence to the Russians. And that is despite the fact that it should be perfectly clear to Washington that Russia cannot help but make efforts in a region that is so important to it—important both from the standpoint of economic interests, and in terms of its participation in filling the security vacuum that exists there.

Behind the polite goodwill of U.S. official circles regarding the Russian role in international affairs, it is difficult not to sense systematic efforts to counter that very role. Including with the help of both traditional and chance allies. This may be a manifestation of disappointment with the behavior of Russia, which, contrary to expectations, has not placed itself under the guardianship of Western society and has not been imbued with the U.S. State Department's fundamental conclusion to the effect that changes in the world are now occurring exclusively because of the "successful use of American power," and that the development of the global situation increasingly "accords with American interests."

In this connection, the attempts to somehow shove Moscow aside from participating in the Middle Eastern peace process reveal a general Washington line of doing the utmost to underscore its role of singlehanded peacemaker.

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It is also possible that, in the context of the current events in the Caucasus, the dynamics of Russian foreign policy appear to the West as a most determined demonstration of Moscow's will to defend its vital interests and preserve its full freedom to maneuver. In the opinion of some American circles, it is there, in the Caucasus and around it, that a alleged Russian policy of striving to trample the entire region has once again manifested itself.

Turkey has always been regarded by Washington as a reliable eastern outpost of NATO. And that is what it is. However, under present circumstances, support for it is hardly dictated by Atlantic solidarity alone. Here one sees the same selfish calculation and the same rejection of what would seem to be a perfectly understandable, healthy tendency toward the improvement of Russian-Turkish relations. That is the reason for the encouragement of great-power attitudes and of those who profess the idea of a great Turkey.

In the meantime, life has shown that Ankara has clearly not justified the loftier hopes of the past few years. The idea of a pan-Turkic alliance, that is, an alliance under Ankara's aegis of all the Turkish-speaking countries, autonomous entities and communities, which some of the former USSR's republics were supposed to join, faded rapidly in the face of economic realities and the country's own internal disorders. Therefore, what is left is to count on what already exists. And of course, without any unnecessary fuss, to elegantly participate in those tense regional games in which the goals of American policy are directly or indirectly apparent.

For example, games involving Caspian oil and the regulation of the Black Sea straits. It is a secret to no one that Turkey's toughening of the rules for the passage of tankers through the Bosporus and Dardanelles creates difficulties for Russian oil exports and reduces the importance of the Novorossiysk port. On the other hand, additional prospects in the oil market are opened up for Turkey, which is making a great effort to "push through" the project for building a pipeline from the southern republics of the former USSR through its territory.

In this situation, incidentally, Russia may be supported by its historical partner Greece. Greece is prepared to take part in building an oil pipeline from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis. Thus, it would be possible to help the Turks "relieve" the Bosporus and Dardanelles by offering Russia an alternative route for shipping oil out to the Mediterranean Sea.

In short, today we once more see an intertwining of interests in one of the world's most nervous regions. Without in any way disputing the legitimacy of such interests for the United States and its closest allies and partners, we should at the same time make it perfectly clear that Russia must not be regarded as an outside entity here. Pertinent geographical, historical and sociopsychological realities lie behind those state interests and its right to its own game in that space.

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Political Issues

Zhirinovskiy's Declaration Following Skorochkin's Death

954F1474A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 4

["Political Declaration of the LDPR Parliamentary Group"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **State Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Loginov transmitted to the editors of VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK the text of a political declaration of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] parliamentary group and requested that it be published with the view to informing the voters about the work of the deputies. The declaration was adopted by the parliamentary group in February (we are printing it with abridgements).**

Killed was Sergey Grigoryevich Skorochkin, deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, a member of the parliamentary group of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Killed was Andrey Daynisovich Ayzderdzis, deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federal Assembly, member of the parliamentary group "New Regional Policy."

Killed was Valentin Semenovich Martem'yanov, deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, member of the parliamentary group of the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation"...

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State Duma Deputy S. Skorochkin more than once turned to the chairman of the State Duma, I. Rybkin, with a request to protect him from racketeers and bandits who have clearly based themselves on the support of law enforcement organs. For half a year I. Rybkin did not receive S. Skorochkin. Rybkin surrounded himself with an enormous guard: From office to dacha.

During this time, several assassination attempts were made on Skorochkin, one day he was able to defend himself against killers only by some miracle.

During this time his 10-year old daughter was raped and violated in the most malicious manner. Saving the life of his nearest and dearest, the deputy was forced to leave for England. It was there that he lived before his death.

Not long before the tragic denouement, I. Rybkin deigned to receive Skorochkin. Again the deputy asked for protection. An idle and useless discussion ensued. Soon after Sergey Korochkin was seized by people in militia uniforms and killed.

How can we talk about obedience to law on the part of the population, if now even the very life of a State Duma deputy is not worth anything? He can be killed with impunity. His family can be terrorized with impunity.

How can we talk about obedience to law by people like Dudayev, if deception, corruption, falsification, hypocrisy, and indifference to the fate of the deputy reign in the State Duma itself?

As is well known, a fish decays from the top. And so does the State Duma.

The chairman of the State Duma today is not the chairman of the State Duma. He is whatever you like—trying to persuade, playing the hypocrite, maneuvering, dissembling, and seeing himself already as president of the Russian Federation, only not the chairman of the State Duma. This is one of the greatest misfortunes of our Duma. Through the fault of I. Rybkin, the State Duma today is going through a deep crisis. There is only one way out—the dismissal of the chairman. This is a fundamental question: Either I. Rybkin leaves the post of State Duma chairman now, or the State Duma will simply be dispersed by other destructive forces.

This is the first thing.

Second. We demand, being concerned about the good of the general cause, the disbandment and reorganization of three committees of the State Duma now: The Committee for Defense, the Committee for Security, and the Committee for Geopolitics. In conditions of the military conflict in Chechnya, all three of these committees have demonstrated their complete feebleness and inability to exert an adequate influence on the course of events and to conduct matters in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Moreover, some of the members of these three committees went out of their way to do everything to aggravate the tragedy of the Chechen people and all of the peoples living in the territory of Chechnya.

Third. It is necessary to introduce, without delay, a correction in the Law on Weapons. It is necessary, at last, to give State Duma deputies the right to carry personal weapons for protection, since the law enforcement organs have completely kept aloof from their direct obligations—to guarantee the security of State Duma deputies.

There is no democracy. There is "democratic" terror. Dudayev, Kovalev, the assassins of our deputy colleagues, and the mafia, which has made its way into politics, and politics which has plunged into the mafia—all this is of the same rank. Against the background, we demand a resolute regrouping of the foreces in the Duma. We demand the replacement of our inactive, cowardly, and weak-willed leaders by energetic and strong-willed leaders, capable of breaking the ruinous course of events.

[Signed] V. V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the LDPR parliamentary group

FROM THE EDITORS. Today, at 11:00, in the Marble Hall of the Kremlin, President Boris Yeltsin will deliver

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an annual message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. In addition to the deputies, members of the government, the directors of the federal organs of judicial power, the executives of the autonomous republics, the heads of oblast administrations, and other persons were invited to hear the president's message. It is of interest whether the LDPR parliamentary group will take part in this measure—the group which refused to be present at the sessions of the State Duma right up to the fulfillment of its demand: To conduct a vote on the question of the removal of Yerin from the post of minister of internal affairs. The reason is the failure to adopt measures for the prevention of political assassinations of deputies from the opposition, in spite of numerous warnings, demands, and inquiries.

Media Issues

Suzdal Journalists' Conference on Post-Soviet Media Noted

954F1421A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Feb 95 p 6

[Article by Yuliya Salnikova under the rubric "Meanwhile: The Mass Information Media":"Journalists Are Dissatisfied with the State, but That Does Not Prevent Them From Living"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A 3-day international congress of journalists organized by the Suzdal-Club and the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] Center for Theoretical Studies and Russian Reform was held in Suzdal a few days ago.

The director of the Center, Professor Aleksey Kara-Murza, defined the congress's mission as an attempt to analyze the condition of domestic mass information media in post-Soviet Russia. The place where the event was held was not chosen randomly—first, "everyone has already gotten pretty tired of the Moscow get-togethers," and secondly, the Suzdal-Club is a unique kind of synthesis of "provincial exotica and Moscow brains."

The congress joined together not only representatives of the printed and electronic press, but also professional analysts for whom the congress is a most important focus of research. In the scholars' opinion, at this time the conflict between the Russian mass media and the authorities consists in, on the one hand, the state not knowing how to listen to independent information, and on the other, the independent press being disinclined to seek partnership relations with the state. (According to Professor Leonid Polyakov of the RAN Institute of Philosophy, in this situation the present lack of understanding between the press and the authorities resulting from the Chechnya events is merely the final part of a conflict which peaked long ago—"if there had been no Chechnya, it would have had to have been invented—naturally, not in the bloody sense of the word," one of Mr. Polyakov's colleagues formulated this idea.)

At the same time, the scholars recalled the leading lights of the domestic mass media's struggle for freedom—Mr. Poltoranin and Mr. Satarov. While the former (in Leonid Polyakov's interpretation) assumes that only state mass media can be independent, the latter (the way that same Professor Polyakov presents it) believes that the press must be independent of politics—the fact that journalists have taken a particular political stance has served as the reason for all the subsequent "sins and mistakes." Nonetheless, Leonid Polyakov personally believes that the entire experience of Russian journalism's activities is evidence that today's press has been transformed from an infrastructure of a contemporary civil society into a superstructure independent of the state. "The mass information media is essentially the state itself—the only thing we need from it is information on what it is doing and what it intends or does not intend to do, while the mass media is nothing less than the 'spiritual body' of society," emphasized Professor Polyakov.

Another participant in the congress, Oleg Vitte, presented the rather surprising idea that "despite the fury with which the government and the press are attacking one another, they do not represent a serious reciprocal danger." Mr. Vitte's assertions are based on the fact that "the SMI [mass information media] are not a force the state is based upon; at the same time there are no real social or political groups able to impose their will on other groups in Russia today; therefore nothing really threatens the mass information media either." (Professor Polyakov nonetheless cautioned those present against underestimating the government which is "by no means so harmless and defenseless." Numerous stories of coup d'etats, of which Leonid Polyakov counted 20 during the past half year, are readily disseminated by journalists and in his opinion, may find fertile soil in departments like Korzhakov's; society will then certainly have to decide how influential the social group which made use of this is.) Oleg Vitte sees the main function of the SMI in that they "paralyze any political decision capable of harming the stability of the unique Russian political system." But this uniqueness consists in the fact that our political system operates in a stable Brownian movement mode, and in these conditions, the SMI's opposition is an additional factor ensuring this stability.

In short, Professor Kara-Murza stated, while both the press and the government subjectively interpret the situation as "fairly dangerous"—the mass media are constantly afraid of certain decisions made by the government which are unfavorable to them, while officials in turn accuse the SMI of deliberately undermining the foundations of the Russian state system; today's SMI and the government balance each other out. Despite all the external tension and sincerity of the mutual accusations, the interrelations of the first and fourth estates are not so very unusual—our SMI perform the very same function as they do in the West, that is to say, they keep the state at a distance and to some degree monitor it. Pavel Gutiontov supported this point of view and noted that "the press is not a professional opponent of the

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government and not a hack politician; the press is a monitoring organ and its mission is to catch the government in lies."

But the government, in the opinion of Yuliya Kazakov, an expert of the Glasnost Protection Foundation, has not fulfilled the mission of protecting freedom of information, and no one will protect the press other than the press itself.

Media 'Moral Self-Control' on Chechnya Urged

954Q0130A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by M. Tsogorelyy: "Is 'Censorship of Emotions' Possible?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dozens of times during the last couple of weeks my foreign journalist colleagues have posed the question during conversations as to why it is now possible in Russia for the press to treat events in Chechnya as they are - and in this sense, for many newspapers to treat the actions taken by the government, and government troops in particular, namely IN THIS WAY. This would hardly befall the readers and viewers of the world's most democratic of countries.

At a recent "round table" held in the Russian-American press center American journalists discussed the curious, and in many ways instructive history of a photograph, which we have published here. Taken during the first days of the war on an island in the Pacific that had been attacked by the Japanese, the photo did not appear on the pages of American newspapers for almost two years - for censorship considerations. In the country a ban was being strictly observed against publishing materials, to include photographs, that indicated losses incurred by the American side. First and foremost, the ban applied to the depiction of dead bodies. Only in 1943 was this ban lifted when the allies superiority had become more or less clear, and the attainment of victory, only a matter of time. It was namely then, the second year of American participation in the Second World War - which had already been underway for four years - that this photograph was first published in the journal LIFE. Meanwhile, you can ascertain for yourself that the photograph contains nothing even similar to being compromising or derogatory for the American armed forces. In any war every army incurs losses, a fact which can hardly be called a military secret.

Of course, this was not a question of censoring information being disseminated, which the enemy could use in his interest. Those secrets were guarded by the U.S. Department of Censorship, headed by former journalist Byron Price, who, incidentally, was not guided by some secret instructions, but by the Code of Wartime Practices, which was accessible to any citizen, and reporters first of all. This was a question about censorship of a moral and ethical nature, the practice of dispensing emotions capable of generating an unhealthy reaction in society toward events at the front, as well as in soldiers toward the method of reporting these events. The founders and publishers of mass media posed a single, yet paramount question: In the name of what is the public to be offered certain information? What kind of feelings will an article, photograph, or radio broadcast evoke? Pride for one's country, and pain over the losses it has born? Or, on the contrary, will the horrors of war be brought into every home, and demoralize the public, undermine its will to fight, and for victory? The old wartime photo from LIFE is once again indicative in this regard. Its composition, and the picture's angle of the approach are sparing. What is also important is that the faces of the deceased are not visible, and that there are no torn off extremities or ripped open bellies in the stillshot, although in all likelihood there were those who were mutilated among the dead soldiers. Psychologically, every individual and social entity has quite specific limits for perceiving violence. When these limits are violated by a barrage of dark events, murders, disfigured bodies and streams of blood, breakdowns in the behavior of citizens and social groups are likely. Experience has confirmed this more than once.

However, analyzing the given statement, drawing conclusions and making recommendations, is a task sooner for scholars and psychologists. For journalists the ethical side of the problem is more important. Those of our readers who are a little older will remember the burning rejection in American society that resulted from the war in Indo-China. The citizens of the United States and many other states in the world fought against the war using available methods. The policy and practices of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon's administrations were subjected to condemnation, to include by many newspapers, radio and television companies. The presidents themselves received their fair share. However, were there many reproaches, and what is more, accusations directed at the American army and soldiers, at the hands of whom the war was being carried out; a war which evoked such a fierce rejection in society? No, and this is precisely the point, as long as the question did not concern military criminals, like those, for example, who destroyed the Mai Lai village.

And this is no accident, for in a mature civil society the concept is deeply embedded that the army is only an instrument of state policy, operating to carry out the will of the country's political leadership. It is senseless, fruitless and very dangerous to bring down an emotional blow of such terrifying force onto military service members. Stillshots of disfigured corpses, faces distorted with pain, and the bodies of wounded soldiers - is this society's payment for loyal service to the fatherland? How justified are these stillshots (as well as reports of a similar character in newspapers) from a moral and ethical perspective?

Not long ago one of the most well known directors of the Moscow mass media admitted that he would never make public the intimate aspects of life of the new Russian

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Bohemia. That, he said, would be an encroachment on their privacy, a violation of their lawful human rights. In the same newspaper, however, it is considered entirely in order to encroach upon the private lives of military service members and their families. After all they are not the Bohemia.

Perspectives on war and the army engaged in battle are far from unanimous. Society and its various groups and strata, and those who express the interests of the latter - the various forms of mass media - can accept a war, (in general, as a method of resolving disputed issues with the armed forces) or leave it (by undertaking a specific campaign). However, to subject ones own troops to additional blows, from the rear and in the back...

A demoralized army costs any society dearly, regardless of whether it emerges from the war a victor, or suffers defeat; and that includes on a moral level as well as financial. The American army was dealt the final blow not by the Vietnamese partisans, but primarily by the American press. Fifteen years were required following the war to restore the combat capability of the U.S. armed forces. Many troops left the ranks, having considered themselves as party to a dirty war, although the consciences of the majority of soldiers were left unmarred. Mass desertion and draft dodging has forced America to change over to a contract system of recruitment. This has meant hundreds of billions of dollars in additional military spending, plus the billions that the Department of Veterans' Affairs spends even now on the psychological rehabilitation of participants in that war.

The press is a sharp weapon. Great is the responsibility of those who hold this weapon. The producer of a news program for the television company ABC, Richard Greenberg, while addressing his colleagues, reminded them that "We can criticize the government, and for this reason we should always act with the greatest responsibility." When the press is running a story about individuals, to include soldiers, officers, and generals, this responsibility is even greater, for it is much easier to inflict harm upon an individual than a government.

Television broadcast, now frequently airing reports directly from locations live - CNN, in particular, has a reputation for this - is very difficult to subject to censorship on an informational level. On an emotional level it is practically impossible. Nonetheless, our foreign colleagues demonstrate far greater tact, and take a firmer moral stand than many Russians; even when interacting with the parents of military service members, to include those who died while fulfilling their military and civil duty in Chechnya.

At the end of 1945, summing up all of his military experience, the director of American censorship during World War II, Bayron Price, wrote the following in a report to President Truman: Censorship of mass media should be voluntary. Journalists who consciously adopt specific limitations for their actions - although corresponding with the general principles of freedom and democracy - work more effectively than those working under the "iron heel" of stricter control. It seems to me that this idea is warranted not only with regard to keeping military secrets, but for preserving moral principles in society. Moral "self-control" on the part of a journalist is his contribution to the attainment of stability in society. Otherwise, it goes without saying...

Federal Assembly

Aleksandrov Outlines Concerns About Proposed Anticrime Law

954F1433A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 15 Feb 95 p 13

[Interview with Aleksey Aleksandrov, chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on National Security, candidate in juridical sciences and deputy chairman of the "Choice of Russia" faction, conducted by correspondent Vladimir Prokhvatilov: "Clumsy Work"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Thank God, we do not foresee any "troikas," but special judges, quite possibly, will emerge.**

A group of deputies headed by the chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on Combatting Crime and Corruption, V. Kolmakov, prepared the draft law, "On Combatting Organized Crime," which, if adopted, may return our society to the gloomy times of political terror. The chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on National Security, candidate in juridical sciences and deputy chairman of the "Choice of Russia" faction, Aleksey Aleksandrov, gives his opinion on this draft.

[Correspondent] Could you tell us about the specific principles of the draft law which violate human rights?

[Aleksandrov] This law contains much that is positive. Its general principles contain a declaration of the priority of human rights. There is a new conception of exposing bribe-takers, which significantly expands the possibilities of the law enforcement agencies at the stage of preliminary investigation, allowing them to listen in on or to observe suspected persons, a practice which is used by police throughout the world. It also permits a sort of "test" for officials accused of bribe-taking.

[Correspondent] In other words, it will be possible to perform a "set-up," offering a bribe to an official? Is this ethical?

[Aleksandrov] There is no argument. A moral dilemma arises here. Is it good to test an official for honesty by such means? This question may be answered very simply: Do not take the bribe. Refuse it, if only out of principle, if only out of mistrust or out of fear of punishment, which will be extremely severe—confiscation of all property, imprisonment and disgrace.

However, the draft law contains a number of statutes which are extremely dangerous. It touches upon the

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judicial system, and specifically introduces the institution of specialized judges. Moreover, it provides also for special courts, the sadly infamous "troikas." Thank God, after raising a big commotion, we were able to persuade the authors of the draft law to reject this terrible instrument of the Stalinist inquisition. Alright, they said, there will be no "troikas," but there will nevertheless be special judges, in order to conduct special cases at all levels of the judicial vertical.

[Correspondent] And what is the specific feature of this special judgeship?

[Aleksandrov] The fact that they hear only cases on organized crime. And this means that the judges will be known to all—investigators, officials, as well as to the bandits themselves. Practical experience shows that when a judge and an investigator know each other, informal "agreement" relations are established between them. They coordinate their positions, establish the so-called "telephone right." And even the appearance of jurisprudence disappears. If you make so much as a peep, you will get 30 years.

[Correspondent] But how to combat the mafia? After all, today nothing is working in this regard.

[Aleksandrov] There are various methods. For example, if a criminal group is detained, and offers resistance, it should be destroyed. Our detectives must have the right to act more boldly, to shoot if necessary. As the police do throughout the world. However, we must protect the system of jurisprudence against pressure on the part of the investigative agencies or the officials, as well as against bribery and threats of bandits. One judge, and moreover one who is known to all ahead of time, is practically impossible to protect. But, for example, twelve barristers—that is another matter.

The draft law has many vague and unclear formulations such as the following: "The creation of a criminal organization is punishable by imprisonment for a term of from 7 to 10 years."

[Correspondent] And what do they propose to consider as a criminal organization?

[Aleksandrov] In the draft law this is an association of three or more persons... for the purpose of committing specific grave criminal actions, "or for other forms of functioning of the organizations."

[Correspondent] If we leave such an unintelligible formulation then, perhaps, we will be able to put away people for what someone decided to fabricate about three people.

[Aleksandrov] Quite simply. Or, here is one other intricate phrase: A criminal association is a unification of persons... for creation of "other favorable conditions for criminal activity." And for such a criminal association it proposes imprisonment for a term of up to 20 years. It would be possible to accuse practically any person of anything. They point the finger at you, and that is it. Better to shoot yourself, because, under present-day conditions, it is impossible to withstand 20 years either in jail or in a camp.

Furthermore, Article 17 unties the hands of the special subsections, permitting practically any act of violence against citizens: "Actions which, though applicable under indicators of criminally punishable law, but committed in fulfillment of a special assignment received by a worker of the law enforcement agencies, except for murder and grave bodily injury, are not deemed to be a crime." That means, if the workers of the law enforcement agencies, in fulfilling some assignment, happen to rape someone, or spread bacteriological weapons, or simply break someone's arm on purpose, they will not be punished, because this will not be a crime.

[Correspondent] Thus, we will receive the Russian variant of the "death squadrons" or—let us recall domestic tradition—we will return to the practice of "Yezhov's rule with an iron rod?"

[Aleksandrov] When one reads this draft law, one thinks that, perhaps, its authors should not have gone to all this trouble. It would have been enough simply to reproduce the edict of the USSR VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] of 4 December 1934 (immediately after the murder of Kirov), according to which the cases of "terrorists" were investigated within a period of 10 days, reviewed without participation of the parties, did not permit appeals, and the sentence carried out immediately after it was imposed. Quick, harsh and effective.

[Correspondent] Russia's citizens have become so tired of the dominance of bandits on the streets and the lawlessness of the officials, that very many of them are ready to embrace the harshest measures for combatting crime and, evidently, the authors of the draft law are playing on these sentiments of the people.

[Aleksandrov] We need the harshest measures against bandits and bribe-takers, but not at the expense of honest citizens, and not by means of a return to state terror.

[Correspondent] And is there a democratic alternative to this draft law?

[Aleksandrov] I do not agree with the statements of some of our ministers and officials from the power structures, who say that we cannot do anything without strict new laws. That is not true. Today there are a sufficient number of laws regarding murder, violence, and extortion, and they provide for harsh sanctions. The draft law on the fight against organized crime prepared by the State Duma Committee on Security, I repeat, has many prudent principles which, in my opinion, should be introduced into the effective criminal-procedural legislation. But at the same time—we should reject the overall ideology of the project, which is permeated with the spirit of Stalinism.

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[Correspondent] As far as I know, the subcommittee which you head up, and which operates within the framework of the State Duma Committee on Security, has prepared one other draft law—on reform of the state security organs.

[Aleksandrov] This work proceeded in close cooperation with the president's administration and the Federation Council. We are proposing expanding the functions of the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] and adding intelligence and the fight against corruption to the work of counterintelligence, changing the name of the organization accordingly to the Federal Security Service (FSS). It is also necessary, in our opinion, to increase parliamentary control over the FSS. Today we control only the budget and hold parliamentary hearings. This is clearly not enough. The draft law, "On the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation," was coordinated on all controversial questions by a coordinating commission formed at the initiative of the president. Finally, we began working together with the executive branch on one of the most acute and controversial questions. This is very important, since the former KGB [Committee on State Security] (currently the FCS), which at one time was a mighty organization, has today been rather weakened. Strengthening the organs of security and increasing their effectiveness is absolutely necessary, primarily for achieving a victory over the mafia and corruption. The FSS will also have to control the internal affairs organs, where corruption is especially dangerous. After all, in order to sweep the floor in a room, it is necessary to bring the broom to order. It will also be necessary to strengthen the prosecutor's oversight of the internal affairs organs.

Moreover, it is necessary to return to the FSS the functions of preliminary investigation, since there are such crimes which, under today's conditions, only the workers of the security organs can investigate at a high level (these are contraband, espionage, terrorist acts, treason against the Homeland, and application of biological weapons).

[Correspondent] The intelligentsia is very wary of the concern by the authorities for "strengthening" the organs of state security. The proposal to return investigations to the security organs also evokes alarm. Not to mention the fact that this forestalls the long-awaited idea of finally creating a unified investigative committee in our country. Experience shows that any "departmental investigation" inevitably leads to bias and lack of objectivity. Can you, Aleksey Ivanovich, assure the readers of the fact that the draft law which you are developing will not lead to consequences which are just as grave as that which V. Kolmakov prepared?

[Aleksandrov] Strengthening of the country's security organs is necessary. B. N. Yeltsin spoke about this repeatedly during 1994. The struggle against crime, terrorism and corruption demand this. If the organs were seriously strengthened, had special structures of the "Vympel" type, we would not have had the grave mistakes in Chechnya, and they could make a greater input also into the struggle against banditism. I might add, we must also strengthen the struggle with foreign special services and other intelligence services. Today, they say, foreign intelligence has greatly stepped up activity on the territory of Russia.

I do not see anything strange about this. There are such processes going on here which are attracting the attention of the entire world. And this is normal. And it will be normal for us to intensify our counterintelligence activity. The law also contains some serious democratic innovations. Priests, judges, prosecutors, lawyers or deputies will not be able to serve as FSS agents. This is a very moral decision. There are professions in which the common man must have unconditional trust.

As for the establishment of a unified investigative committee, the jurists of all countries, including myself, are dreaming about this. But this is a matter for the distant future, or at least not for the present day. For the present, we are forced to relate both legislative activity and practical actions to that harsh reality which exists in Russia today.

Regional Affairs

Moscow Oblast Duma Seeks Yeltsin Prosecution on Chechnya

954F1463A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Tokarev under the rubric "Near Moscow": "The Oblast Duma Is Against the War in Chechnya: Deputies Intend To Petition the Constitutional Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Discussion of the course of the military operation in the Chechen Republic at a recent meeting of the Moscow Oblast Duma resulted in the adoption of a strongly worded decision. The deputies believe that if the special commission set up by the State Duma for investigation of the events in this region uncovers violations of the RF [Russian Federation] Constitution and current legislation, the question of removing the RF president from office and bringing criminal charges against the guilty should be brought up.

As early as 28 December of last year the Duma adopted a political statement in which it spelled out its principled position. The substance of it is that, in the deputies' opinion, using regular units of the RF Armed Forces for the purpose of resolving by force the conflict in the Chechen Republic, which had long been festering with the connivance of the highest federal authorities, the president and the RF Government had violated the Social Accord Treaty.

On 25 January 1995 the oblast duma appealed to the RF president and all "enforcement" ministers to send to

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hotbeds of armed conflicts military servicemen who have received all the necessary military training, instead of new draftees. In addition, in connection with numerous communications from parents concerned over the fate of their children in military service, the duma sent a special request to Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev asking him to make available complete information on the number of servicemen drafted into military service from the territory of our oblast and sent to the Chechen Republic in connection with military operations being conducted there, as well as the names of the dead, wounded, prisoners of war, and those missing in action. So far there has been no response to this petition.

I did receive, though, an official reply to my deputy inquiry from the oblast military commissioner, General Yuriy Chuyko, which says that as of 6 February of this year they are aware of 28 military servicemen who have died in Chechnya.

The absolute majority of deputies, and of different political orientations at that, supported the Moscow Oblast Duma decision, which, among other things, says:

"As a result of the actions of the highest organs of state authority of the Russian Federation, and their failure to use to the full extent the provisions of Articles 85 and 114 of the RF Constitution, the conflict in the Chechen Republic festered for three years. Today full-scale military operations are being conducted in a region of the Russian Federation without declaration of a state of emergency; the blood of Russian citizens and military servicemen is being spilled; and national-economic complex facilities are being destroyed. The president of the Russian Federation, as guarantor of the RF Constitution, bears full responsibility for the state of affairs in the country.

"Having noted the above, the Moscow Oblast Duma has resolved: to ask the commissions set up under the State Duma and the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly to conduct a special investigation, to consider the question of the legality of the actions of the RF president and the RF Government in the Chechen Republic, and in the event of violations of the RF Constitution and current legislation being uncovered, to bring up the question, in keeping with Article 93 of the RF Constitution, of removing the RF president from office and bringing criminal charges against all guilty parties."

The oblast deputies appealed to legislative organs of state authority of Russian Federation components to support their initiative, adopt the appropriate decisions, and address them to the Federal Assembly—the parliament of the Russian Federation.

An inquiry is currently being prepared on behalf of the oblast duma regarding the conformity to the RF Constitution of the RF president's edicts and government decrees on the basis of which the RF Armed Forces were deployed in the conduct of military operations in the Chechen Republic.

Former Russian KGB Chairman Ivanenko Interviewed on Chechnya

954F1357A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 5, 8-14 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Viktor Ivanenko, former chairman of the KGB of Russia, by Andrey Zhdankin; place and date not given: "Dudayev Succeeded in Seizing Something From Nuclear Charges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The real reasons for the Chechen tragedy, which the authorities prefer to shamefacedly call a "crisis," have not been fully known up to the present time. The truth has to be acquired literally in bits and pieces. The politicians who risk talking on this subject either blame each other or they portray their own role in a favorable light. One can believe either documents or disinterested witnesses.

We published a document in December of last year—a letter of Procurator General of Russia B. Stepankov that in many ways explains how and why the Dudayev regime became the owner of a huge amount of arms. We continue the discussion on this theme today. Many of the roots of the present tragedy relate to the time of the first crisis, when, it is true, it was called a Chechen "revolution." The culmination of these events was the dispersal of the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia and the seizure of the building of the KGB of the republic. It can now be asserted that these two events clearly characterize the regime of Dudayev, who replaced party authority, but the Russian leadership perceived this differently. Knowledge of how the events really took place and how the central authority reacted to them make it possible to understand and even partly to explain the current situation. Viktor Ivanenko, who was chairman of the KGB of Russia at that time, tells the story.

[Ivanenko] Several factors determined the situation in Checheno-Ingushetia in August of 1991. Doku Zavgayev's government, which was permeated from top to bottom with a system of extortion, caused heartburn for a majority of the republic's population. It was necessary to pay for any position. This system, of course, existed even before Zavgayev, but the vices in the system in our country are usually blamed on the leader. In addition, the vices that occurred in the republic were associated by many sources directly with the names of Zavgayev and his brothers. Among these factors is the struggle between clans and tribes that is going on even now, but it manifested itself especially at that time. These rumblings were also reaching the Russian leadership. For example, Mr. Khasbulatov invited me and said: "Bring this Zavgayev here, to Moscow, in a cage."

The dissatisfaction of the people was aggravated by the socio-economic situation. I would also name the religious-historical factor. The Chechens are the only people who came into Russia involuntarily; they were conquered. All of the living generations remember the "Chechevitsa" operation—the forced resettlement,

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when half of the people were killed. The last factor was the August events in Moscow. Dudayev seems to have appeared in their development, even in support. Although it was clear from the very beginning, especially to the KGB, that these people were simply using the moment and the anti-putsch mood as a Trojan horse.

It has to be taken into account that Russia was the engine of the anticentrist and centrifugal processes, and if something like this also appeared elsewhere, then the people who were developing this movement were perceived as allies.

....On the evening of 23 August I received an HF call from Groznyy. Kochubey, the chairman of the republic's KGB, was calling. "A crowd has broken into the committee building." I asked for one of the representatives of the new authority. The telephone was picked up by Yandarbiyev, the current vice president of Chechnya. "What are the claims?" "We suspect that you will remove documents...." In order to remove suspicions, I proposed that two people remain with the service duty officer. These people remained, and the crowd left after negotiations. But the threat remained.

[Zhdankin] Did you inform the Russian leadership about the situation in Groznyy?

[Ivanenko] We sent information both to Yeltsin and Rutskoy before and after the events associated with the dispersal of the Supreme Soviet and the seizure of the KGB building, but, unfortunately, it was not always interpreted adequately. Rutskoy, for example, reproached me for the fact that we were finding justifiable motives for Dudayev. As a matter of fact, I was trying to report the full complexity and the multilayered nature of the situation in Chechnya to the leadership.

We proposed our own variants: Not to accept the rules of the game proposed by Dudayev, but to intelligently combine the policy of forceful economic pressure; after all, all of the financial levers were in Moscow. It was necessary for Dudayev to propose something; after all, he was expecting retaliatory measures. It was necessary to have a comprehensive plan of Russian actions in the North Caucasus, a concept, expressing it scientifically. I had long talks on this subject with Starovoytova and Burbulis. They understood in words, and they agreed, but I doubt that this got to the top.

[Zhdankin] Did you familiarize yourself with the situation in Chechnya right on the spot?

[Ivanenko] The KGB building was seized on 6 October. Having requested an aircraft from the commander of the Border Troops, I was preparing to fly to Groznyy. It was necessary before the flight to get the approval and authority of the leadership of Russia. I called the president on HF; he was then resting in Sochi. A guard took the phone: "I will find out right now.... The president cannot talk with you now." I called within five hours. The answer was the same.

The Vympel group was already at that time on the staff of the KGB of Russia, and I could have conducted an operation to clear the building. There would have been blood. In a normal state the force ministries and the leaders of special purpose services are not supposed to take responsibility on themselves for such steps. To make such decisions is the direct duty of the political leadership.

I was on the way to the airport when suddenly Vice President Rutskoy called me on the car phone. "Delay your flight; I will fly with you." Andrey Dunayev (minister of Internal Affairs of Russia) arrived with Rutskoy, and with a platoon of submachinegunners.

While we were in the air, we discussed the situation and outlines of operations. I said that I would try to free the building by peaceful means, meet with the elders, and explain the complexity of the situation in the Caucasus. Rutskoy explained in reply how he had resolved problems in Afghanistan. "A battery was firing at us from a village, and somebody was killed. I sent up a couple of aircraft—there was no village. I burned up a couple of villages—the firing stopped." He said about the same thing has to be done here also. I did not feel quite myself.

After landing, Rutskoy asked that a one-on-one meeting with Dudayev be organized, "as pilot to pilot, and general to general." They retired to a hotel room and talked for two hours.

When they came out, Rutskoy took the initiative and declared with assurance that they had come to an agreement on everything, and that there would be no problems. But Dudayev did not nod, and he did not echo him. Apparently, Rutskoy took what was desirable as real. And he there and then left for Narzan.

The next day I specifically began to work on the problem of freeing the building. I decided to appoint a Chechen—Akhmet Khatayev—as acting chairman of the republic's KGB. My next step was a meeting with Dudayev. I tried to make a peaceful introduction, but Dudayev was literally initially programmed for conflict. "This evening a security guard detained a KGB employee who was trying to penetrate the building. This is your scout, and you came to Groznyy especially to organize a provocation. I am giving you four hours to leave the territory of the republic, after which I cannot vouch for your life. My people will escort you."

I tried to explain that an electrician of the government communications section, a young fellow 19 years of age, who was on duty every three-four days, had not known about the seizure. He came to work, the building was surrounded by submachinegunners, and he decided to leap over the fence. He had to come to work. Is it necessary to raise a fuss over this episode? Dzhokhar Musayevich "took the bit between his teeth," interrupted the discussion, and rushed out of the building.

We were simply chucked out. We left for Vladikavkaz under a convoy of machinegunners. On the next day, a

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Dudayev representative came to soften the reaction to this incident. They decided that the blockade of the building would be lifted after the elections for president of the Chechen republic.

After this, Stanislav Pyatakov, my deputy, flew to see Dudayev, but the Dudayev clique had already developed an aggressive inertia, and the Russian leadership, not only on this problem, but also on other positions, conducted itself amazingly passively.

[Zhdankin] Did the leadership know about the results of your trip?

[Ivanenko] I sent detailed information, but I did not get any reaction. When I returned, I dropped in on the White House; a plenary meeting of the Supreme Soviet was going on, at which Rutskoy was stirring up passions and demanding almost emergency powers to bring order to Chechnya. This seemed strange to me, since he had left Dudayev almost with his arms around him in an embrace. But the first thing that the vice president did on returning to Moscow was to give an interview in which he said, "There is no democracy in Chechnya, but gangsterism." But it is impossible to declare to the entire republic that they are gangsters.

I had a talk with Burbulis. Gennadiy Eduardovich, as always thoughtful, said something of the sort: "This requires conceptual understanding," and he proposed that I speak directly right then to the session.

In a short impromptu speech, I tried to say how complex the processes were in Chechnya. The only thing I asked was not to make rash decisions, and not to talk with Chechnya in the language of an ultimatum.

The chamber was wound up by Rutskoy's speech, and, after me, he rushed to the rostrum once again, and demanded that I be discharged from my position for speaking against the vice president. The chamber broke out in applause.

Khasbulatov grimaced, but he did not put this proposal up for a vote. The decision on an ultimatum to Chechnya passed.

After this followed the edict of the president on the declaration of a state of emergency in Chechnya. A Rutskoy assistant brought me a draft of the edict for initialing beforehand. I refused, and I wrote my own remarks. But, nonetheless, the edict appeared. Neither the force ministries nor representatives of the political leadership participated in its development, and no one consulted with scientists and specialists on the North Caucasus. The edict was "forced through" by that eminent specialist on national problems, Aleksandr Rutskoy.

It was difficult to choose a more unfortunate moment: On 7 November—the edict on a state of emergency, and within two days, Dudayev's inauguration. With these decisions, Dudayev's prestige was raised to an unprecedented height, especially when they had to be taken back.

Few know that at 0400 hours, after the adoption of the edict, Rutskoy sent for me, for Minister of Internal Affairs A. Dunayev, and for Procurator General V. Stepankov. He tried to scare us that he would bring us to court for "sabotage," and that he would even have us shot. Ruslan Khasbulatov entered with his customary pipe and began to egg Rutskoy on: "Aleksandr Vladimirovich, are these presidential boys really capable of doing something?"

Dunayev's assistant there and then began to prepare a telegram with a demand to arrest Dudayev. I regret to this day that I did not at that moment refuse to sign.

This whole experience has been repeated now, only with tragic consequences. Again there were no consultations, preliminary checking, or preparations.

[Zhdankin] There are very many versions about who it was that left a mountain of weapons in Chechnya and why.... The feeling is that apparently something important is being held back....

[Ivanenko] By way of speculation, I will suggest the version that the Soviet Army left weapons in Chechnya, because Dudayev succeeded in seizing something from nuclear charges and later made this a trump card in a trade with the Russian leadership.

[Zhdankin] But the explanation that some of the leaders made money is inadequate?

[Ivanenko] Initially, the military and employees of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the state security service simply lost their heads, and it can be said that they were demoralized. For example, even General Sokolov, who headed the Groznyy garrison, a competent person, wavered. He was forced in a reply to the demand of Dudayev supporters to remove the special section from the territory of the military compound. Dudayev was applying pressure in all directions.

[Zhdankin] Two days before the dispersal of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, you removed Igor Kochubey, chairman of the local KGB. This fact is being interpreted in various ways in the press....

[Ivanenko] Kochubey is now speaking in tandem with Zavgayev, but it is interesting that I removed him exactly at the initiative of Zavgayev, who sent a telegram addressed to USSR President Gorbachev with a demand to dismiss the entire leadership of the law enforcement organs of the republic as not having coped with control over the operational situation.

[Zhdankin] Did the local KGB send alarming telegrams to Moscow that a coup was being prepared, but there were no replies?

[Ivanenko] Actually, there were telegrams. But immediately after the dispersal of the Supreme Soviet, Khasbulatov and Aslakhanov arrived in the republic and, with

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their arrival, "blessed" the dispersal. Immediately after, Burbulis and Poltoranin arrived in the republic. That is, the movement in Chechnya was recognized as democratic.

[Zhdankin] What do you think, could the special purpose forces have resolved the Dudayev problem with specific methods, for example, tactfully in some way?

[Ivanenko] I am not confident that this would have resolved the problem. Some kind of an action against Dudayev will not replace the absence of a concept and a well-thought-out policy on the Caucasus. But, to answer specifically, I think that it was possible.

During these three years, Dudayev was in Moscow and in the Moscow suburbs with his wife's relatives, who live in Pushkino. Dudayev attempted to make contacts with the Russian leadership, and I suspect that at the time of these arrivals he met with somebody from the Russian leadership. He flew on aircraft—is it really difficult to land an aircraft in Russia's air space?

Many of the Chechen businessmen, for whom Dudayev, who has now ruined all business, was in the way, were ready to resolve the problem fundamentally, given certain material investments. But instead of this, they began to recruit volunteers in the Taman division. At a minimum, Dudayev should be grateful to the one who devised the current operation.

[Zhdankin] What do you think, what fate awaits Dudayev personally?

[Ivanenko] Obviously, neither the one nor the other will let him get out of this bloody mess alive. He knows too much.

Oblast Admin Head Indinok Comments on Chechnya

954F1434A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 1

[Statement: "I. I. Indinok's Position"

[FBIS Translated Text] **Last Wednesday, at a session of the oblast Council, oblast administration head I. Indinok distributed among the deputies the following statement of his, which reveals his position concerning the Chechen events.**

To the Deputies of the Novosibirsk Oblast Council of Deputies

Recently the public has been observing with justified alarm the development of the Chechen crisis.

Unfortunately, the mass media have not always presented accurately or completely my position as a deputy to the Council of the Federation or my actions as Novosibirsk Oblast administration head.

At sessions of the Council of the Federation and at meetings with representatives of the press and the public, I have repeatedly stated my attitude toward the events in the Chechen Republic.

I am forced once again to repeat that my position lies in the following:

Russia is a federative state, on the entire territory of which, including the Chechen Republic, the Constitution of the Russian Federation must be in effect.

The bloodshed on Russian land must be stopped as quickly as possible.

The disarming of all illegal formations must become one of the basic conditions for conducting negotiations.

The responsibility for the situation that has developed must be borne by the specific individuals who made egregious errors both strategically and tactically.

At a session of the Council of the Federation in December 1994, during the discussion of the Chechen problem, I made the following additions to the draft of the decision:

1. Propose to the President of Russia that he take steps for the immediate cessation of combat actions by all sides;

2. Demand that all the opposing sides in the Chechen Republic disarm al the illegal military formations and cease any provocational actions;

3. Note that the leadership of the Council of the Federation has not taken sufficient steps to execute the 8 December 1995 [as published] decree of the Council of the Federation, entitled "The Situation in the Chechen Republic" (which stipulates the peaceful resolution of the problem);

4. The President of the Russian Federation is to prevent the violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation when taking steps to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence, and its state integrity.

Unfortunately, only the first two proposals were adopted.

All assertions to the effect that "Indinok voted for the war in Chechnya" are outrageous lies. Certain so-called politicians have been using for a long time various provocations, insults, and slander as the basic means for achieving their personal political goals. Nothing is sacred for them: having caused the collapse of the Union, they will not stop until Russia's integrity has been lost. The fates of Russians disturb them less than petty political gain does.

As to what is being done by the oblast administration with regard to the Chechen events:

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The oblast administration allocated 21 million rubles to purchase packages to be sent, specifically addressed, to persons from our oblast who are serving in Chechnya. A total of 250 such packages were prepared and delivered to military personnel who are located directly in the combat actions zone. At the request of the command element of the Siberian District of Internal Forces, warm clothing was purchased for military personnel who are performing their duty in the area of Chervlenaya village.

More than 6 million rubles were allocated for mothers of military personnel to travel to the conflict area.

Unfortunately, there have been deaths among the military personnel from our oblast.

The administrations of the cities and rayons are allocating, for the purpose of organizing funerals, lump-sum material assistance to relatives of those who have died, in the amount of no less than 50 minimum wages.

According to operational information, one person from Novosibirsk Oblast is being held captive. The administration of Leninskiy Rayon has allocated more than a million rubles to the soldier's father to travel to Groznyy. It is known that the Dudayev regime releases prisoners only to their parents. There is no other information concerning the capture of military personnel who were inducted from Novosibirsk Oblast.

A special telephone has been installed in the provisional SibVO [Siberian Military District] information center. All expenses to pay for long-distance telephone calls from parents to military personnel—of which there are more than 40 a day—are paid for by the oblast administration.

On 13 February a directive was signed, concerning the allocation of 15 million rubles to render material and financial assistance to wounded miliary personnel from Novosibirsk Oblast who are undergoing medical treatment in hospitals. I inform you that, in conformity with the government's decree, two family members have the right to visit a relative who has been wounded and who is undergoing medical treatment in a hospital, with the costs of transportation, meals, and lodging being paid, at the expense of Ministry of Defense, at the serviceman's place of treatment.

I hope that in the future, with the cooperation of the oblast Council, the agencies of local self-government, and the public and press, we shall continue to render psychological and material support to those who have suffered in the course of the Chechen conflict.

The bloodshed on Russian land must be stopped!

The President, the Government, and the Federal Assembly must declare their responsibility for the failure over a prolonged period of time to take the necessary steps to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic, which led to the tragedy.

[Signed] I. I. Indinok, Novosibirsk Oblast administration head, deputy to the Council of the Federation. 15 February 1995.

Federation Member Constitutions Reviewed for Conformity to RF Law

954F1405A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Preserve a Unified Constitutional Field"]

[FBIS Translated Article] **The State-Legal Directorate of the president of the Russian Federation has carried out an analysis of the draft constitutions of several republics and of the charters of a number of krays, oblasts, and autonomous districts from the point of view of their conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Today we inform the readers of the results of this work.**

In the draft constitutions and charters, in defining and regulating the measures for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen and the rights of national minorities and in the introduction of the institution of citizenship in the republics and the establishment of the status of an inhabitant of a kray or oblast, equality of the rights of citizens with respect to national traits, place of residence, and other circumstances is not always guaranteed. As a rule, they regulate the legal status of the person and set forth the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen. In accordance with articles 15, 18, 61-63, and 71 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen operate directly throughout the territory of the Russian Federation and the regulation of the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, just as questions of citizenship in the Russian Federation, belong in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

The drafts unequally narrow the provisions of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, under which the recognition, observance, and protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen are the obligation of the state as a whole and not just that of the bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation and bodies of local self-government.

In most cases, they duplicate the provisions of the Constitition of the Russian Federation on the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen. In so doing, they frequently restrict the rights and freedoms of other citizens of the Russian Federation, because individual rights and freedoms of citizens are linked with citizenship in the republic or with the status of being an inhabitant of a kray or oblast. For this reason, it would correspond to constitutional requirements not to repeat the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen set forth in the Constitution of the Russian Federation but rather to establish additional guarantees of rights and

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freedoms on the part of the bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation.

Several drafts establish restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen that are not permitted by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, a chairman of a legislative (representative) body or a head of a body of executive authority of a subject of the Russian Federation or their deputies, heads of structural subdivisions of staffs of a legislative (representative) body or bodies of executive authority, and other officials of bodies of executive authority of subjects of the Russian Federation are forbidden to be involved in managing bodies of political parties and movements, political clubs and groups, etc., that is, there is a restriction of the right of everyone to associate as foreseen in Article 30 of the Russian Federation. Procedures are set forth for the formation of bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation that include restrictions of the rights of citizens with respect to nationality and that set a maximum age limit (55 or 60) for heads of administrations, residence requirements for the right to vote, immigration quotas, etc. At the same time, in accordance with Article 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen may be restricted only by federal law.

Not all of the provisions of the draft constitutions and charters on the constitutional-legal status of the subject of the Russian Federation and on the bases for state and administrative-territorial organization conform to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In a number of cases, it is set forth that a subject of the Russian Federation possesses full state authority in its own territory and indepedently defines its own state-legal status, which does not correspond to articles 66 and 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Some republics define their constitutional-legal status as the status of a sovereign state within the Russian Federation and set forth that the republic is voluntarily transferring some of the questions to the exclusive authority of the Russian Federation, is voluntarily joining the Russian Federation, and has the right to full or partial denunciation of the federal contract. In the draft charters of some krays, oblasts, and autonomous districts, the status of these subjects of the Russian Federation is defined as a state or state-territorial formation. Prohibitions are made against the withdrawal of a kray or oblast from the Russian Federation or their separation within the framework of the Russian Federation. Autonomous districts that are part of a kray or oblast are defining their status without consideration of the circumstance that they are part of the corresponding kray or oblast. These provisions do not conform to articles 3-5, 15, 65, 66, 71, and 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and mean a unilateral change in their constitutional-legal status by the subjects of the Russian Federation. Positions on the adoption of charters by the population through a referendum rather than by legislative (representative) bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation do not conform to the requirements of Article 66 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In the sections of the draft constitutions and charters on the state and administrative-territorial system of the subject of the Russian Federation, unjustified use is made of such concepts as "national-state system," "national-territorial system," and "national system," whereas the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not include such a concept as "national-state system of the Russian Federation." Under the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the state system in the Russian Federation is based not only on the national-territorial but also socioeconomic and other principles that are the foundation of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation.

The drafts proclaim that the only source of state authority is the people of the republic, kray, oblast, or autonomous district and that it realizes its authority directly or through a system of state bodies. This narrows the constitutional principle of democracy established by Article 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, in accordance with which the people realize their authority not only directly and through bodies of state authority but also through bodies of local self-government that are not part of the system of bodies of state authority. There is thereby no consideration given to the circumstance that the source of authority in the entire territory of the Russian Federation, including in the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation, is the entire multinational people of the Russian Federation and not just the population of the subject of the Russian Federation that makes up a part of it.

Frequently the drafts set forth declarative provisions on the guaranteeing of the representation of all the peoples living in the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation in the bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation. They not only are impracticable but likewise are not in conformity with the constitutional principles of democracy and equality of citizens before the law regardless of their nationality or place of residence as set forth by articles 3, 19, and 27 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The provisions of the draft constitutions and charters on the supremacy and priority of the constitutions, charters, laws, and other normative legal acts of the subject of the Russian Federation in its territory are often formulated without consideration of the provisions of articles 73, 76, and 78 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, that is, the provisions on the effect of federal laws throughout the territory of the Russian Federation without any restrictions.

Draft constitutions set forth without any comprehensive analysis provisions to the effect that the official languages of the republic are the languages of the peoples

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living in its territory, which makes these norms declarative and does not provide for real legal equality of languages. Some krays, oblasts, and autonomous districts in violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislation are also planning in their charters to establish an official language and autonomous districts recognize not only Russian as the official language but also the languages of the peoples inhabiting their territories.

In the sections in almost all of the analyzed draft constitutions and charters on the demarcation of the jurisdiction and powers between the bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation and the federal bodies of state authority, there are conflicts with the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The most typical violations of articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are the norms and provisions of the drafts:

—on the supremacy of the subject of the Russian Federation with respect to national wealth and on the exclusive ownership of the land and its mineral resources, water, timber, flora and fauna, and other natural resources in its territory;

—on the right of the subject of the Russian Federation to establish procedures for the control and disposition of facilities of federal ownership turned over to its management and disposition and to legislatively regulate questions of the status of the state bank of the subject of the Russian Federation, the organization and activities of territorial federal bodies located in the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation, including law enforcement agencies, and questions of the guaranteeing of state security and on the right to engage in financial, foreign-exchange, and monetary-credit regulation;

—on the attitude toward the jurisdiction of the subject of the Russian Federation over international and foreign-economic relations and treaties and so on.

In many cases in violation of the norms and provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the draft constitutions and charters regulate the organization of the work of bodies of executive authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation and define their powers.

The organization of the system of bodies of state authority of subjects of the Russian Federation proposed in some drafts does not conform to the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on the division of state authority in the Russian Federation into legislative, executive, and judicial authority and also on the independence of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state authority, inasmuch as the drafts give priority to the legislative (representative) bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation, thereby violating the principle of the separation of powers. This also violates the provisions of Part 1 of Article 77 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation whereby it is necessary for the system of bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation to conform to the bases of constitutional order.

The constitutional principle of the separation of powers is not observed, in particular, in the regulation of the interrelations between legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation in the lawmaking process. Thus, a number of drafts set forth provisions under which laws and other normative legal acts of the subject of the Russian Federation are signed by the chairman of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation, whereas regardless of the procedures for the formation of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation the head of the highest state body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (president or head of the republic, head of the administration) must be endowed with the right to sign normative legal acts of the subject of the Russian Federation (laws, statutes, and the like). Such an approach conforms to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and makes it possible to balance the system of legislative and executive authority, especially since the legislative (representative) body has the possibility of overcoming the veto of the president or head of the republic or administration with a qualified number of votes.

Instead of a deferring veto, the drafts provide for the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation to protest and suspend the effect of a law or other normative legal act of a subject of the Russian Federation that has already been passed by the legislative (representative) body and gone into effect. The head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (head of the administration) is endowed, on the one hand, with the right to sign laws of the subject of the Russian Federation but, on the other hand, has no right to decline them.

The provisions of the draft constitutions and charters on the bases for the removal of the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (president or head of the republic, head of the administration) from office likewise are not always based on the norms of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal legislation, under which, for example, the constitutional court of the republic and the bodies of the procurator's office have no right to determine the existence (absence) of signs of a criminal offense in the actions of the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation as a basis for removing him from office. The powers of the legislative (representative) body to express a lack of confidence in the body of executive authority resulting in its dismissal and also to remove the president or head of the republic or administration from office is not balanced by the right of the head of the highest state body of

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executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation to dissolve the legislative (representative) body of state authority and to set early elections.

Frequently heads of executive authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation (presidents or heads of the republics or administrations) are endowed with powers that they may not possess under the Constitution of the Russian Federation—for example, the right to declare an emergency situation in the territory or individual locations of a subject of the Russian Federation. At the same time, no consideration is given to the fact that in accordance with Article 88 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation an emergency situation may be declared only in the circumstances and in the manner provided for by federal constitutional law. They are also improperly being endowed with the right to repeal acts by the heads of the administrations of rayons and cities, whereas bodies of local self-government are not being included in the system of bodies of state authority in accordance with Article 12 and Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Moreover these powers infringe on the prerogatives of judicial bodies.

The heads of the administrations are endowed with powers for the legal regulation of the procedures for the holding of elections of heads of local self-government, although in accordance with the constitutional principle of the separation of powers legal regulation of this kind is the prerogative of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the provisions of the drafts on the compulsory implementation (execution) by bodies of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation of acts passed by the legislative (representative) body of this subject likewise do not conform with this principle, because not all of the legal acts, in particular intraorganizational acts, passed by the legislative (representative) body are compulsory for bodies of executive authority.

Procedures for the coordination of the appointment of the corresponding officials of federal territorial bodies, procurators of the subjects of the Russian Federation, judges, and others with bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation are regulated prematurely prior to the passage of the corresponding federal laws.

In many cases, the provisions of the draft constitutions and charters on the status and powers of legislative (representative) bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation also contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation, especially the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

Thus, the following powers do not correspond to this constitutional principle and go beyond the scope of the work of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation:

—the right to affirm the structure of the bodies of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation and to determine the structure and procedures for the formation as well as the powers and organization of the work of the committees, directorates, departments, sections, and other structural subdivisions of the bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation;

—the right to establish the accountability of the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (president or head of the republic, head of the administration) to the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation, including the right to hear the annual report of the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation on the situation and information from him with respect to the execution of laws and the budget and the realization of specific programs and plans for social and economic development and to impose on him and other officials of bodies of executive authority the duty to appear at meetings of the legislative (representative) body and of permanent commissions of this body to respond to the inquiries and requests of deputies and commissions and to present reports;

—the right to affirm appointed deputy heads of the body of executive authority and other officials as head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (as president or head of the republic or head of the administration);

—the right to monitor the observance of the laws in the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation, the utilization of credit resources and appropriations from the federal budget and nonbudgetary means and foreign-exchange funds of the subject of the Russian Federation, the disposition of property, including federal and other property that was transferred to bodies of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation for administration, the effective placement of production and social facilities as well as the rational use of natural resources, the conservation of the environment, economic activities in the territory of the Russian Federation that could have serious ecological, sanitary-epidemiological, and demographic consequences, and the execution of treaties with foreign partners. Deputies and permanent committees are being improperly endowed with supervisory powers, because as internal working bodies of a legislative (representative) body they can be established only for the provisional review and preparation of questions in the jurisdiction of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation. Special bodies are needed for the monitoring of the execution of the budget and a number of other control functions.

The powers of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation to repeal acts of the head of the body of executive

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authority of the subject of the Russian Federation do not conform to Article 10 and Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The chairman of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation is frequently endowed with functions and powers that are not inherent in this office. In violation of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, he is being endowed with powers to represent the interests of the subject of the Russian Federation in the Federal Assembly (regardless of whether or not he is a deputy of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly) and to present state awards and prizes, diplomas on the conferment of honorable titles, etc.

Draft constitutions and charters set forth provisions on the immunity of deputies of legislative (representative) bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation and provide that they may not be detained, arrested, or subjected to search and personal inspection. These provisions are not in conformity with articles 71, 72, and 76 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation or with the criminal-procedural and administrative-procedural legislation of the Russian Federation that is called upon to regulate such questions.

Provisions of the drafts to the effect that the powers of the legislative (representative) body of state authority of the subject of the Russian Federation may be suspended ahead of time by the Federal Assembly on the basis of a conclusion by the Constitution Court of the Russian Federation do not follow from the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Provisions of the draft constitutions and charters on local self-government does not always correspond to provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

A number of drafts establish norms that contradict the constitutional provision on the population's independent defining of the structure of the bodies of local self-government. Provisions of the drafts to the effect that heads of rayon and city self-government are appointed by the head of the body of executive authority of the subject of the Russian Federation (president or head of the republic, head of the administration of the kray, oblast, or autonomous district) and that local self-government is accomplished within the boundaries of administrative-territorial units are not in conformity with Article 12 and Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In accordance with Article 132 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, bodies of local self-government are endowed with separate state powers without an obligation for their agreement, which is not considered in a number of draft constitutions and charters. They are unjustifiably introducing provisions to the effect that the status of the capital of the republic or city that is a kray or oblast center is determined only by the law of the subject of the Russian Federation, although their status as the territorial basis of local self-government must also be defined by the charter. Provision is made for the establishment of representative bodies of state authority in urban and rural settlements and other population centers as well as in rayons, which contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Draft constitutions and charters set forth provisions involving judicial authority prior to regulation by federal constitutional law and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, the establishment of a judicial system and the organization and procedures for the work of the courts of the republic, kray, or oblast, the introduction of provisions on the independence of judges and their subordination not only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws but also to the constitutions, charters, and laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and the establishment of norms involving the provisions for the administration of justice on the basis of and in accordance with constitutions, charters, and laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation contradict Article 71 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, in accordance with which the administration of justice pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, and Article 118 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, under which the judicial system of the Russian Federation is established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and by federal constitutional law.

So-called statutory (constitutional) courts are being introduced improperly as bodies of judicial authority prior to the passage of a federal constitutional law, for the judicial system of the Russian Federation, including the system for the constitutional courts of the subjects of the Russian Federation, is also established by federal constitutional law.

Draft constitutions and charters unjustifiably establish powers of bodies of the procurator's office. In particular, violations of articles 71 and 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are provisions establishing bodies of the procurator's office to protest legal acts of a subject of the Russian Federation or acts of a legislative (representative) body of state authority of a subject of the Russian Federation and bodies of executive authority of a subject of the Russian Federation in the event that they contradict not only the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws and acts of the president of the Russian Federation and Government of the Russian Federation but also legislative and other normative legal acts of a subject of the Russian Federation. Also a violation of these articles, among other things, is the granting of powers to procurators to issue conclusions on the legality of acts of bodies of executive authority of a subject of the Russian Federation and on the existence of a crime in the actions of particular officials of bodies of state authority of a subject of the Russian Federation.

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The drafts use terminology not based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation or complicating its application because of ambiguity or multiple meanings. An example is "law," which is understood to mean not only the law of the subject of the Russian Federation but also federal law, "prevailing legislation of the Russian Federation," "law of the Russian Federation," "normative acts of a legislative (representative) body of a subject of the Russian Federation," "joint jurisdiction of bodies of state authority of a subject of the Russian Federation and local self-government," "status of a state-territorial formation (subject of the Russian Federation)," "local bodies of authority and self-government," and others.

Thus, the violation in the draft constitutions and charters of the constitutional delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and bodies of state authority of subjects of the Russian Federation and of the principles of the legal equality of citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of their nationality and place of residence as well as of the constitutional principle of separation of powers and constitutional guarantees of local self-government should be considered to be among the most substantial deviations from the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

President's Mailbag: Complaints on Not Controlling Local Officials

954F1404A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed article under "The President's Mail" rubric: "In Moscow, They Are Complaining About the Lack of Control of Officials"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the country and Government of Russia received more than 36,000 letters last year and at the beginning of this year on questions involving actions by agencies of administration and self-government.

The basic theme of all of these letters was the need to take measures aimed at strengthening the unity of the Russian state, organization, and order in all links of administration, accelerating the development of common principles for the organization and work of the three branches of power at all levels, and participation of citizens in the administration of the state through the structure of local self-government.

Concern of Russians for the fate of their Motherland was manifested especially acutely in connection with the events in Chechnya. In the opinion of the authors of the letters, they revealed the inadequacy of the legal basis of the state administration in the face of national, religious, and parochial manifestations.

The people writing to the president write about the backwardness of lawmaking with respect to economic and state development. About 4,000 suggestions were received on the improvement of Russian legislation.

A number of authors were outraged by the lack of coordination of federal and local laws and by attempts of some local authorities to give priority to their own decisions over federal decisions. There are also reports of a lack of mutual responsibility of workers of executive and judicial bodies. In the past year, there were 736 reports of nonperformance of judicial decisions, some of them by executive agencies.

Judging by the mail, extremely slow progress is being made in the establishment of the structure of local self-government. This is also seen in the insignificant amount of correspondence, in its theoretical nature, and in the narrowness of the problems raised in the interaction of bodies of self-government with local administrations. There are many complaints about the lack of control of the latter and about their independence from the populace and conservatism in the resolution of questions involving land use. The head of the administration of Gabovskiy Rural Council (Moscow Oblast), for example, personally sold off 400 hectares of crop land of "Ostankino" Sovkhoz. A check by the rayon administration showed that there were no assemblies of the people here, they did not consult with the citizens, there was no inventory of the land, and not a single local tax was introduced. The head of the rural adminstration was dismissed from his work.

At the present time, as some state, local problems are in the hands of administrations that sometimes counteract the normal work of elected bodies of self-government. The inaction of the duma of the town of Balabanovo in Kaluga Oblast has been reported by its deputies. There has not been a single meeting of the town duma for a year now.

An analysis of the mail indicates the undeveloped nature of interrelations between federal bodies and the highest bodies of authority of the subjects of the federation. According to a report by S. Belyaev from Yekaterinburg, for example, the oblast court found the "largest part of the articles in the Provisional Statute on local self-government in the oblast" to be illegal and the Supreme Court of Russia left this decision unchanged. But elections were nevertheless held on the basis of this statute by decision of the oblast administration.

A number of letters present cases in the regions of nonperformance of basic requirements of the constitution of the country with respect to state order. In the second year after its adoption in Ryazan Oblast, there is no affirmed charter and elections for local authorities have not been held. "This makes it possible to abuse the local budget and to sell off state and local property with impunity and without control," think I. Polikanov and others from Ryazan. N. Lebedkin, a deputy of the oblast duma, writes about the lack of congruence of individual statutes of the charter of Kurgan Oblast with the Constitution of Russia. He asks the president of the country to "suspend the effect of the charter until unconstitutional norms have been removed from it." N. Mityusheva,

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chairman of the Komi party "Doryam Asnymos," thinks that the constitution of the Republic of Komi does not correspond to the Constitution of Russia. Some authors think that the adoption of the constitutions of the republics that are subjects of the federation infringes upon the interests of the Russian-speaking population of these regions (V. Kamayev, Udmurtskaya Republic).

One of the problems encountered most often in the mail and in the responses to appeals from the heads of local administrations for control is that of the interaction of federal and local budgets and the financial coverage of some expenditure articles of federal laws. There are many requests from the regions for financial assistance from the federal budget and for the allocation of preferential special credits and approval of complex programs for the development of territories and production. Individual authors state their perplexity at the inability of administrative bodies to force taxpayers to make full payment to the state, supposing that the state treasury "receives less than half of the taxes from commercial organizations."

Authors of letters think that the lack of a law on local self-government is leading to uncertainty about their functions and status and the impossibility of executing the right to participate in elections for bodies of local self-government that the Constitution of Russia guarantees to citizens.

The authors are proposing that the heads of administrations, especially of cities, rayons, villages, and settlements, be elected and that they be required to report to the people. There are also proposals on the election only of elders in small villages and settlements, whereby they would appoint secretaries and land surveyors as assistants. Some individuals suppose that it is necessary to begin elections of local bodies of administration and self-government from the bottom level. They also think that local statutes on elections must be examined by experts for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the legislation of the country and subjects of the federation.

In the mail, one can hear a persistent demand for greater responsibility of local bodies for the economic state and development of municipal services, transportation, and the social sphere of their regions. Some local administrative bodies are being criticized for being estranged from production problems and for lacking programs for the creation of new jobs, utilization of local raw materials and traditional trades, and development of enterprise and farming. In individual cases, the authors think that branch federal ministries and their local production structures must exercise significantly more influence on the development of the regions and their social sphere.

The mail indicates that under the conditions of the market one of the priority problems is that of the juridical enlightenment of the citizens and their provision with free assistance in the explanation of legislation, the establishment in some cases of legal-consultation services under local bodies of executive authority, and the purposeful work of the mass media. It is also necessary to provide for the legal preparation of workers of local administrations and the leadership of bodies of local self-government.

The mail also contains requests from the authors for consideration of the interests of small compact ethnic groups in the elaboration of the law on local self-government.

Samara December Wage, Inflation Figures

954F1174A Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Prices, Wages, and Inflation in Samara Oblast at the End of 1994"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With respect to prices, the situation at year's end developed practically no differently from the preceding month. Of the list of 22 foodstuffs monitored by the state committee for statistics, prices for nine remained at the previous months' level and rose with respect to 13. Prices for bread, vegetable oil, potatoes and vegetables, sugar, salt, medicines, and tobacco items have not changed over the month. Other prices continued to rise, however, including a record 1.5-fold increase in prices for butter and vodka (obviously unwelcome at the time of the upcoming New Year celebration).

There was an increase in prices for milk and margarine (by 20 percent), frozen fish (25 percent), bologna and salami sausage (30 and 14 percent), wheat flour, eggs, meat, and matches (3, 4, 8, and 15 percent).

The situation at farmers markets was even more drastic: Practically all foodstuffs (on the monitored list) with the exception of eggs went up in price over the month. The peak of the price increases fell, similarly to organized trade, in the last two weeks.

The situation with light industry goods prices was relatively untroubling: Prices rose with respect to five and remained unchanged with respect to 11 items.

Among the items whose prices went up are woolen and silk fabrics, men's jackets and shoes, and women's light overcoats.

Prices remained unchanged over the month with respect to cotton fabrics; children's shoes, cotton shirts, jackets, and tights; women's fall boots, summer shoes, dresses, and pantyhose; and men's cotton shirts and socks (see appendix).

Wages and Inflation

December reaffirmed the not-too-optimistic month-old forecasts: Prices for the main categories of consumer goods and services for the population rose by another 16 percent.

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The financial base of the population's living, on the other hand, did not improve equally rapidly. We mean wages. The specificity of statistical information is that it operates only with mean values.

It cannot be otherwise, because a mere enumeration of the amounts of wages paid in each sector, enterprise, and category of workers would result in a many-volume effort, not to mention commercial secrets that conceal concrete data.

So in the oblast as a whole the wage of persons employed in the national economy for the time worked last November comprised R312,000 (R284,000 in October of this year, and R118,000 in last year's November).

The absolute leader by the amount of earned wages was the information and computer services sector, where the average employee earned over the month R525,000.

Persons employed in the credit services, finance, insurance, and social security sector must have felt more comfortable (from the standpoint of financial independence) with R445,000; those working in transportation (even after the 6-percent cut in wages as compared to the preceding month, their earnings exceeded R395,000); the construction sector (R376,000), and those working in industry (R373,000).

It was also the aforementioned sectors, with the exception of construction, that have managed to stay ahead (by the rate of increase) of the monthly inflation jump.

At the same time, wages earned in science institutions (R189,000), and culture and the arts (R170,000) were one-third below the oblast average, and in agriculture and forestry they measured half the oblast average (R155,000-154,000).

Local National Republican Party Leader Interviewed

954F1468A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 6

[Interview with Igor Nikolayev, chairman of the Novosibirsk department of the National-Republican Party of Russia, by Andrey Arbenyev; place and date not given: "'Our Idea Is a United State' Say the Leaders of the National-Republican Party of Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The National-Republican Party of Russia [NRPR] is traditionally considered by some journalists and politicians to be "extremist" and even "fascist." Its leader, Nikolay Lysenko, a State Duma deputy, who supported the military action of the Government of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, has been called by deputies from the democratic faction as surely a "barbarian" and "mad." In general, a lot is said. But what do the leaders of the NRPR themselves say? Igor Nikolayev, chairman of the Novosibirsk department of the NRPR, came to VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK's editorial office, where we conducted an interview with him.**

[Arbenyev] Tell me, what is the numerical strength of your party in Novosibirsk? It is rather extensive in Moscow, but what about here?

[Nikolayev] Today, 10 people remain. Why is this? With the passing of time, people who were hoping for quick changes in the country are disappointed. Some were disappointed in the fact that we are not radical enough. The events of October 1993 also had an effect. It was necessary to have courage to participate in an organization like ours. After all, persecution had started.

[Arbenyev] But exactly what is it about your party that is being persecuted?

[Nikolayev] We state the national question very sharply. But you perhaps know that saying the word "Russian" means you are a fascist. That is, if you said "I am Russian," you are immediately called a fascist. I will not indicate who is now calling us fascist, this is not the point, and besides, a denationalization of Russians is also going on, as it did 72 years ago. However, such accusations of fascism are completely absurd. It is simply that not everyone understands just what the Russian idea is.

I will recall this incident for you. In 1993 on 19 August I was picketing at the Marx Square metro with our imperial black-gold-and-white flag. A person, sturdily built and obviously not Russian, came up to me and asked: "What kind of flag is this?" I explained: "This is the imperial flag of Russian nationalists." Then he said: "Does this mean that you are against me, because I am a Yakut?" I answered: "Our idea is a united state from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, where not one living people has priority over another. Everyone is under equal conditions. If you want to wear your national clothing, speak in your own national tongue, and sing your own songs, then no one will put any obstacles in your way. This is your personal affair. But also, no one has the right to oppress another nation." The reaction to my explanation: The Yakut shook my hand, and we parted friends.

[Arbenyev] Nevertheless, why is your party accused of barbarous nationalism and fascism?

[Nikolayev] You know, like in Dostoyevskiy, all we have left are the Pavel Verkhovenskiys and Smerdyakovs. Just who was Verkhovenskiy? A revolutionary who said that if it is necessary to kill a child for the happiness of all humanity, then we will kill it. This is from "Demons." But from "Brothers Karamazov," there is Smerdyakov—a man-servant who grieves that Napoleon did not conquer us in his time—we would be living differently in the civilized Western world if he had. It is exactly now that the epoch of the Smerdyakovs has arrived. They are prepared to serve anybody. If we agree with such a position, we will perish as a people and as a state. Our so-called nearest neighbors will tear us to pieces.

[Arbenyev] But what, in your opinion, is the solution to this situation?

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[Nikolayev] We see the solution in the restoration of a free independent national Russian state.

[Arbenyev] Do you think that your party will be victorious?

[Nikolayev] The national movement will be victorious. There is no other alternative.

Rutskoy Speech in Novosibirsk Reported

954F1435A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by A. Zharinov: "A. Rutskoy's 'Great-Power' Turn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **On 12-14 February A. V. Rutskoy, the former vice-president of Russia, chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, and founder of the Derzhava [Great Power] social-patriotic movement, visited Novosibirsk. At a meeting in the public-cultural center that was overfilled, Aleksandr Rutskoy was greeted with applause.**

1. "My Pain and Tragedy..."

Gray-haired veterans welcomed the defender of the last parliament, brave pilot, hero of the Afghan War, and politician who, in his more than 40 years, has had a dizzying career.

Currently he is 47 years of age. One must admit that it used to be rare to meet people who, to one degree or another, did not like Aleksandr Rutskoy. Even during those October days of 1993, when he issued the "death by firing squad" edict and issued the call to storm the mayor's office building, many people felt that that was the only way that it was necessary to act. Because it was Rutskoy, the heroic officer, and he knew what to do!

I am absolutely convinced that, for A. Rutskoy, service to the nation is his primary concern. In his understanding, an officer's honor and love of one's Homeland are definitely not empty sounds. All this, I repeat, certainly cannot be doubted. But was that sufficient not only to "personify," but also to lead? And not to the next political immolation, but to the desired and real goal? It was here that A. Rutskoy's intuition and political perspicacity, alas, let him down. Just recall his preelection pairing off with B. N. Yeltsin in June 1991, and his appeal to Siberians to "support and vote!"

"That is my pain and my tragedy," A. Rutskoy admitted to the audience. "I failed to see. I failed to scrutinize. Incidentally, I would even now sign my name under B. N. Yeltsin's election campaign. Much in it was correct... Reasonable. The lesson is: it is necessary to believe not the words, but the deeds."

The former vice-president, who is currently one of the opposition leaders, also spoke in the beginning of his statement about his actions and word-promises.

The general made no attempt to pull out of his hat any arguments to unmask the authorities of acting in a "nonobligatory" manner. Instead, he cited official data. He "spread out" the report given by V. Chernomyrdin, with whom he had made a statement in the State Duma late last year, and his pledges to deal with the domestic debts and wages. He ridiculed the "certain positive results achieved" that had been made public by the president in Lipetsk. He compared the threatening rates of the production slump with the years of the Great Patriotic War and quoted the depressing statistics about the social polarization into poor people and rich people. He also joked in a somewhat crude manner that "back home I have on my television set a tape measure that I use to measure Gaydar's face, in order to know what size consumer basket to put on his head." The audience reacted animatedly to the "joke," but did not learn anything from it. In general, however, the analysis was correct. But well known. Especially to those who had come to the OPTs "for Rutskoy."

"Are we going to keep floundering around? And keep enduring?" A. Rutskoy asked the audience, referring to the "disastrous course" and "Russia's disintegration."

2. New Reading of the Old

Rutskoy's image is certainly perceived by many people as an inquisitive, searching, purposeful nature. But it is also an inconsistent, contradictory one. Proof of this is provided by his "political vacillations" and his search for the ideal. The CPSU "rowdy" who was present at the founding of the Democratic Party and who naively believed in a party schism as a prototype of the multiparty system, was ejected from its ranks. In August 1991 he was in the ranks of the opponents of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency].

Today, after his incarceration in Lefortovo [Prison], he treats his position in August 1991 as the attempt to "preserve democracy from the sending of troops into Moscow" and to hinder the Ogarevsk process. The ones who, in his opinion, are to blame for the collapse of the Union are the party upper class, the "members and submembers... who scattered like rats."

That is a harsh and partially justified reproach. But it is not as unambiguous as presented by Aleksandr Vladimirovich. Speaking as an "evaluator" of the behavior of the members of the GKChP and their political associates, he apparently forgets that, willingly or unwillingly, he continued to be the standard bearer of the "democracy" that degenerated into its opposite.

Then there was the honorary chairmanship in the People's Party of Free Russia [NPSR]. A party which, other than the word "people's," is not clear concerning its goals or name. I might recall how V. Lipitskiy, chairman of the NPSR executive committee, told me in an interview soon after the October days:

"Poor Vladimirovich! He made some mistakes. But we give him moral support in Lefortovo and keep him informed about party matters."

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While the chairman was still in prison, his comrades in arms were intending to rename the organization as the Social-Democratic People's Party. After the amnesty, a constituent congress was held, and A. Rutskoy was once again entrusted with the job of presiding.

The drifting away from the Communist Party to social democracy took just a few years. But at the same time there was also a reinterpretation of Marxism. Its essence, in Rutskoy's opinion, lies in the negation of absolutely all "isms." In a word, it is almost like *diamat* [dialectical materialism]: the negation of negation. But one ought not, for the sake of laying claim to originality, reject what has been recognized in world social science.

What, for example, does A. Rutskoy propose to build in Russia? A society at the base of which lie the age-old human values such as morality, faith, love, respect... Those are, so to speak, the criteria for society in its moral-ethical aspect. But what about the material aspect?

"Social justice instead of social equality," is the "discovery" that A. Rutskoy has made. Create the conditions for implementing the individual's creative possibilities and for obtaining the corresponding reward.

According to Lenin, this can be expressed more succinctly: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor." So a society that is based on this principle is called in science socialism. Unfortunately, it was not realized: in our society, it was not according to labor. Rather, it was on an equal basis. But that is no reason for rejecting the ill-starred "ism," or to infer it in the new party program.

All things considered, Aleksandr Vladimirovich's political drifting has not been completed. At the present-day stage, he expresses doubt that political parties in general will be able to do anything. Today there are more than 200 of them in Russia, including 14 Communist Parties. One would scarcely think that it will be possible to harness them together—each party wants to have its own sleigh. What is needed, to use the term that is currently in vogue, is a unifying idea. And that is what prompted A. Rutskoy to create the Derzhava social-patriotic movement.

3. Why Invent a "Sledge Hammer"?

Why a movement, rather than a party?

"Today the nation is teeming with parties," A. Rutskoy explained. "It is difficult to orient oneself concerning their goals and programs, although all of them are seemingly in favor of the interests of Russians. Society has been divided into the Whites, the Reds, the Greens..."

But movements also have to have their own definite platform, their own goals and tasks. What are they, specifically? Everything is very simple: it is necessary to reject ideology, and to cultivate a "correct" way of life that rests upon national traditions, Orthodoxy, and a system of moral values. Everything else is Utopia! The word element "-cracy" [government, rule] cannot lie at the base of society. Expressing himself in generally accepted folk slang, Aleksandr Vladimirovich seemingly summed up everything by asking, "Why invent a 'sledge hammer'?"

Appealing to the patriarchal ways, the origins of the Russian state system, and traditions and customs is not a new phenomenon. That idea lies at the base of the Russian National Assembly, the Russian Nationwide Union, the Cossack movement... Many of them lay claim, without a shadow of embarrassment, to the role of the chief unifier of Russia. So here is one more pretender. How is he better?

Everyone can judge for himself about this. But I will mention that the term "Utopia" is once again an apt one here for us. Especially after one thinks very carefully about the meaning of the "great-power" innovations: "society itself would self-determine the system of life," "there is no healthy society if there is no healthy family," "we have timber, granite, and sand, but everyone does not have his own home," etc. Honestly, one could easily continue this list of quoted wishes, but they are, if anything, chimeras. They are simply strivings, but to that which is good, to social brotherhood.

And, incidentally, the last-mentioned item is especially emphasized by the members of Derzhava.

"We invite into Derzhava the representatives of all ideological views," A. Rutskoy clarified. "Communists, Constitutional Democrats, monarchists, nationalists—since the main thing is to save the Homeland. And the path to that must be defined by the People's Program."

Incidentally, it has already been thoroughly studied by political experts and will soon be publicized. One line in it has forced people to be suspicious: "It is necessary to create a stable society of the well-off." Herein lies the chief premise of the reforms. In principle, there are no objections to this: man is motivated primarily by his material interest, by the right to own property. But, obviously, one should not vulgarize social relations, seeing behind them only the person's interest in his own skin.

"Nature itself is constructed in such a way," A. Rutskoy said, "that the thing that a person has in first place is 'my.' My Motherland, my family, my wife, my children, my house, my work, my land, my *dacha*, my slippers, my toothbrush... And the program must also be such that it will give a person his own 'my.' Then the sum of them will be 'our.'

"And that will be the 'supporting timbers' that no one and nothing will be able to destroy!"

Possibly. Except that it seems to me that there might, indeed, be something that can overcome those supporting timbers. For example, the psychology of individualism, of money-grubbing, of philistinism.

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Aleksandr Vladimirovich does not conceal the fact that he intends to run for president of Russia and, of course, during his election campaign, to rest upon his Derzhava.

Oblast Internal Affairs Admin Head Interviewed on Crime

954F1424A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr N. Soinov, chief of Novosibirsk Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, by VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK readers in January, reported by Irina Timofeyeva: "Our Readers' Dialogue With the General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In a January report on the crime rate last year, the editors invited the readers to telephone the editorial office with their questions for A.N. Soinov, chief of the oblast internal affairs administration. Today we are publishing these questions and answers, with the exception of some strictly personal requests and comments.**

[I. Sviridov] The State Duma has called the work of law enforcement agencies unsatisfactory. The police themselves say that the crime rate dropped last year, as if they are congratulating themselves, but what does the public think of their performance?

I also have another question. Did they ever find the thieves who burglarized the offices of Lipitskiy's party?

[Soinov] Last year we managed to keep the crime rate from rising for the first time in seven years and we even reduced the rate of crime in the oblast by 16.5 percent. We say this not because we are bragging, but because we are obligated to report to the people. As far as the public rating of our performance is concerned, only the laziest individuals refrain from expressing their opinions today. Just read the newspapers, watch television programs, and listen to the radio. You will hear so many opinions. They are frequently not objective and are insulting to us, but we do catch criminals! We have solved more than 53 percent of 72,000 crimes. Street crimes in Novosibirsk have been reduced by almost 34 percent.

The offices of Lipitskiy's party are located in a private home. The theft of the office equipment was an ordinary home burglary, without any political connotations. Criminal proceedings have been instituted, and an investigation is under way. I think we will be arresting the thieves soon.

[F. Bogachev] Will police posts (booths with an officer on duty and a telephone) be established in residential neighborhoods and on the outskirts? In the evening and at night it is impossible to call the police unless there is a working public telephone nearby. In addition, I want to report that I have lived in the Zatulinskiy neighborhood for 20 years and I have never seen a policeman walking a beat there.

[Soinov] Police report centers are being established now by virtually all of the regional internal affairs subdivisions, and people can go there for help. There is a problem with our telephones. I think they found one solution in Kalininskiy Rayon. By mutual agreement with the administration, a direct line to the desk officer in the 14th Police Precinct is being installed in elevators in the fifth and sixth districts. Citizens can call the police from the elevator to report accidents and request emergency medical aid. This work will be continued.

Thirty cadets from the academic center of the Internal Affairs Administration have been on foot patrol in the Zatulinskiy neighborhood between the hours of 18:00 and 22:00 every day since the beginning of the year. Obviously, we cannot set up a police post in front of each building. The patrol follows a specially planned route, covering the areas with the highest incidence of crime. Other features of the district are also taken into account.

[Anonymous caller] What kind of measures does the chief of the Internal Affairs Administration plan to take against the policemen who demand protection money from street vendors? They openly take bribes on the station highway and in the station square. Does this mean that the police force has an interest in the open-air markets? I live here and I have seen this.

[Soinov] I can tell you unequivocally that we know these incidents have occurred and we are not keeping them secret. We also know that police officers can be the target of ridiculous rumors. When there is evidence of extortion, we institute criminal proceedings, and the guilty parties are immediately dismissed from the police force.

[VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK] A woman who asked to remain anonymous said that two pensioners, aged 90 and 60, are being tormented by threatening phone calls from people demanding that they sell their apartment. The old women are frightened and will not open their door to anyone. They are afraid to go to the police. What should they do?

[Soinov] Questions connected with the purchase and sale of apartments are not matters of police jurisdiction, but I have to admit that unscrupulous practices in this area have been quite common recently. As for the threats, I think there is no other solution but to report the matter to the local police station. I also want to caution citizens who plan to sell their apartments to deal with solid firms with a good reputation.

[Galina K., sister of a policeman] We women were affected immediately by Soinov's arrival. The policemen have almost no days off. This is not reducing the number of crimes, but it is causing problems for their families. My brother and his wife are on the verge of divorce. He has seven years to go before he can retire. I know that the policemen simply sit in the rayon station on their days off. There is no extra pay for night or weekend work. Women have to do all of the work in the fields in summer.

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[Soinov] Speaking objectively, I have to say that there is less crime. The rate of crime in Novosibirsk is 19.5 percent below the 1993 figure. Whatever the case, however, policemen should not "simply sit in the rayon station." A police officer is worthless if he does not know what he should be doing during work hours, and an administration chief is worthless if he cannot organize the duty roster properly. The inspections we are conducting and will continue to conduct allow us to judge the value of each officer. As far as the payment for weekend and night work is concerned, the police force is a budget-funded organization, and, unfortunately, the Internal Affairs Administration has recently experienced frequent shortages of funds (budgetary) even for the timely payment of the salaries of its own personnel. We can only make ends meet when the oblast administration works with the municipal government. Your brother knew what was in store. Each future policeman is warned about the difficulties he might encounter. On the police force we usually have only one day off each week, and at this time we do not have the moral right to ask for more free time. I hope the wives and children of our officers understand this ...

Ireland Proposes Environmental Cooperation With Novosibirsk

954F1424B Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 4

[Unattributed article: "An Irish Invitation To Work Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Novosibirsk Oblast Committee on the Environment and Natural Resources has received an offer of cooperation from Ireland.**

Scientists, environmentalists, and power engineers there have been working on new projects in the production, transmission, and use of energy. Some examples are systems operated by wind, water, heat, and so forth. The Irish have proposed concerted efforts with the Siberians in this important work.

Ireland is close to us in terms of its natural conditions and the state of its environment. In other words, we would seem to have the same problems, and this is why we should work together to solve them. Power engineering projects are being launched under the auspices of Interculture of Ireland, a society well-known in Europe. A year ago its representatives visited Novosibirsk, and then a group of our ecologists went to Ireland.

What can we offer the Irish side? We have several intriguing development projects awaiting incorporation. The thermal pumps designed by the Thermal Physics Institute are one example.

Creation of Regional Power Center in Novosibirsk Noted

954F1412B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by L. Semenova: "Power Engineering Safety: That Is the Administration's Strategic Stand in Relation to Power Engineering"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As was announced at the first press conference of the energy department, work has begun in Novosibirsk to create a regional power center which will follow its own energy policy for the benefit of the country and the "Siberian Agreement."

The fact that the director of the energy department of the oblast administration, G. A. Mamon, has become a permanent member of the Federal Energy Commission (FEK) to some degree suggests that our oblast will no longer drag along in the wake of policy dictated by the Unified Energy System of Russia, but will resolutely try to defend the region's interests. This is the first time the territory has been represented in the state organ.

But what will oblast energy policy be like, and what problems does large-scale power engineering face? G. Mamon told journalists about this. Next to him sat all the responsible employees of the department, ready to present the essential information; they included deputy director L. Zakharov and department chiefs A. Kondratenko and V. Molchanov, as well as the managers of the joint stock companies Novosibugol [Novosibirsk Coal], Novosibirsklestopprom [Novosibirsk Timber-Fuel Industry], and Sibirgazservis [Siberian Gas Service].

The journalists touched upon all the vitally important problems, it seems. Above all the situation involving nonpayments. The question, "How does the administration feel about disconnecting enterprises because of debts?" was heard.

"There has not yet been a complete disconnection of enterprises as such," Gennadiy Aleksandrovich explained. "After all, the enterprises are supporting housing, a key element of the social sphere.

"Moreover, power engineering workers themselves understand that disconnecting means destroying the economy. Although, in fact, there is a governmental document sanctioning even complete disconnection.

"In the oblast we have created a special commission whose permission power engineering workers need to get for even one disconnection.

"However, the situation involving debts to power engineering workers is simply critical. The debt is at the level of 230 billion rubles, and it is not declining. In addition, this was altogether different money."

Journalists were given detailed information on the further development of the oblast's fuel-energy complex. G. Mamon explained why the TETs [heat and electric power plant]-6 must be built and to do what.

The problem of energy support for the oblast's rural rayons, which has become extremely bad, led to seeking the most efficient of two possible scenarios: either build a new plant to replace the entirely decrepit Barabinsk TETs, or decide on building another LEP [electric power transmission line]-500. The second scenario is more

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economical. That was what was decided. The power line extends from Plotnikov to Barabinsk and ensures the transfer of the necessary amount of power.

It was emphasized that along with accomplishing operational tasks, we must certainly not allow ourselves to ignore concern for the future. Taking into account the time lag in power engineering, we must be designing new power engineering capacities today to prevent power engineering's total ruin in 10-15 years. It will possibly be one more TETs, but it would be more rational to build an AES [atomic power plant], considering that raw materials for atomic power plants are being produced in our city.

The department's director also dwelled on the problems of developing an in-house fuel-energy base on the basis of developing and refining our oil reserves and using energy-producing peat in combination with the siftings of anthracite at the electrode plant. Gennadiy Aleksandrovich has samples of these bricks on the shelf in his office, and the first experimental-industrial batch has already been put into production.

Incidentally, people who heat with furnaces like this fuel too.

The department's leadership, in complete agreement with the power engineering workers, is counting on raising the oblast's power engineering safety. G. Mamon takes a positive attitude toward developing alternative, small-scale power engineering for local purposes, miniboilers whose style we are already familiar with in our city.

"They are feasible in places that are next to roads, so there can be no better solution for cottage zones, for example," the deputy head of administration gave his opinion. "Only there is no need to head for the imported model: our Tochmash [Precision Machinery] Plant has already begun to produce these boilers, which in principle differ from German boilers in only one way—they are lower priced."

Since this department level press conference was the first, G. Mamon explained to journalists what the department's functions are and what kind of an arsenal of "management means" it has for influencing the producer. The methods are exclusively economic, and the thrust of the work is aid for power engineering workers on the one hand, and state protection of the consumer on the other. This protection is ensured with the aid of a rate policy which in turn is based on a broad public expert study. Among other things, a regional energy commission (REK) operates permanently, while an expert energy commission operates periodically, when an issue "ripens."

A promising investment policy is also implemented through the rate policy; the administration coordinates this investment policy. The administration has hopes and reason to count on the creation of a unified energy market within the framework of the "Siberian Agreement."

Novosibirsk Industry Leaders Appeal for Stabilization Measures

954F1543B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 1

[Decision of the 8th Session of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of Deputies: "On the Appeal by the Group of Leaders of Enterprises of Oblast Industry to the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies," signed by A. P. Sychev, chairman of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, place and date unknown]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having reviewed the appeal by the group of leaders of enterprises of oblast industry: The production associations "Luch," "Oksid," "Novosibirsk Instrument-Making Plant," "Sever," "Sibbiofarm," the "Ekran" plant and the artificial fibers plant (V. G. Arkhipov, N. A. Bryuzgin, B. S. Galushchak, A. N. Gorb, B. V. Prilepskiy, A. A. Katayev, and V. A. Gushchin) and others—a total of 19 enterprises in all—regarding the situation which has arisen in the oblast's industry, and certain proposed measures for stabilization of its work, the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of Deputies has decided:

1. To recognize the fact that the oblast administration has formulated a working organ for development of proposals on a certain stabilization of the work of industry enterprises; To delegate for participation in this work the representatives of the oblast Sovet of Deputies A. I. Belosokhov, A. A. Kiselnikov, K. L. Komarov and A. A. Stepanov.

2. To assign the committees of the oblast Soviet of Deputies (headed by the Committee on Industry and the Production Infrastructure), in conjunction with the oblast administration and representatives of leaders of industrial enterprises, the task of preparing and submitting for review by the oblast Soviet of Deputies its proposals on stabilization of the work of oblast industry.

[Signed] A. P. SYCHEV
Chairman of the Oblast Soviet of Deputies

Novosibirsk Oblast 1994 Social-Economic Situation Viewed

954F1543A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Administration Collegium"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of social-economic development of the oblast in 1994 and the tasks for the current year were discussed yesterday at a meeting of the oblast administration collegium. The heads of administration of rayons and cities and the economic management staff participated in its work.

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Calling the collegium to order, the head of administration of Novosibirsk Oblast oriented those present toward a business-like and frank discussion, toward seeking means of bringing the oblast's economy out of crisis. "We should not expect anything from the center," he emphasized. "We must count on our own forces and make do with our own resources. Therefore, in the course of exchange of opinions,let us speak primarily about our own capacities and resources for development of production, as well about what to do with those who can work, but do not want to."

Such a tone of discussion, addressed by the chief to the collegium participants was, naturally, not good. As it became clear from the reports by the oblast's first deputy chief of administration, V. Kiselev, and by the oblast's chief financier, A. Stepanov, the social-economic situation in the oblast evokes serious concern. Production volumes are experiencing a sharp decline. Over half of the farms in the agrarian complex are operating at a loss. The oblast's economy is being "undercut" by the problem of non-payments. Many enterprises have exhausted their turnover capital and have huge indebtedness on wages. Unemployment has become a sad fact of life in the oblast. On the whole, however, the strategy of survival, selected last year by the oblast administration, has merely postponed the solution of the problems. The situation remains just as tense as it was then.

On this background, not all of those who spoke held with the appeal by the head of administration "not to ask," but to speak only about their own reserves. Nevertheless, they asked, and offered, and demanded, and recommended, and gave advice. But the essence of the discussion came down to the following conclusion: We will have to find our own way out of the crisis, without counting on help from above. In regard to the question under discussion, the collegium adopted an expansive resolution, aimed at improving the social-economic situation in the oblast.

Bankruptcy of St Petersburg Innovation Bank Examined

954F1412A SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Ye. Konnova: "There Used To Be This Bank in the City: Official Commentary of the Central Bank Administration for St. Petersburg Regarding the Bankruptcy of the St. Petersburg Innovation Bank"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 13 December 1994, the license of the AKB [joint stock commercial bank] St. Petersburg Innovation Bank (SPIN-bank) was revoked by order of the RF Central Bank because of violations of existing legislation and normative enactments of the Bank of Russia, a risky credit policy which threatened the interests of creditors and depositors, unprofitable operation, and failure to comply with economic norms and mandatory reserve requirements.

The first signs of SPIN-bank's deteriorating financial condition appeared in June 1994; in connection with that, the Central Bank's regional Main Administration had already instituted restrictions on operations with personal capital starting on 1 July 1994. In connection with the loss of solvency and the need to protect potential depositors' interests, starting on 20 July the bank's work regimen was made stricter: the bank was instructed to take steps to free resources invested in credits and other assets and without presenting any obstacles, to use all existing capital to fulfill the bank's clients' demands and demands to return capital to depositors and pay off the bank's other debts. At the same time, the Central Bank Main Administration [GU TsB] repeatedly suggested that the bank hold a stockholders' meeting to discuss the situation which had taken shape and decide on measures to get out of the critical financial state. But the removal of the bank's governing board from performance of its functions along with the stockholders' failure to participate forced the GU TsB to send a petition to the Bank of Russia to revoke SPIN-bank's license.

A SPIN-bank stockholders' meeting was held on 4 October 1994, and the decision was made there to voluntarily liquidate the bank. A liquidation commission consisting of the bank's creditors and stockholders was set up to carry out the liquidation procedures, and the main associates of Innovation Bank were retained to work for it. Not a creditor of the bank, the GU TsB conducted several working meetings with the leaders of the commission where recommendations on the basic features of its work were given.

Since the moment the liquidation commission was formed, GU TsB representatives have been taking part in the activity of the working group set up under the commission, providing all possible help in its work. At this time, the GU TsB is making every effort to bolster the working group under the liquidation commission, which is shouldering the main burden of operational work. To do this, letters have been sent to the organs of the procurator's office, the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], and the tax inspection service, as well as throughout the system of commercial banks; the letters contain an appeal to send specialists to work as part of the working group on a permanent basis. At this point, the period for accepting claims from the bank's creditors and clients is over. The efforts of the working group and the liquidation commission have been directed to processing these claims, inventorying property, selling the bank's assets, handling arbitration cases, and in addition returning capital from the bank's debtors. The extent of payouts to the bank's creditors will depend on the success of these measures. An account has been opened at the GU TsB for the liquidation commission. Balances of capital from the bank's correspondent account and other accounts have been transferred to it, and the bank's capital deposited at the Central Bank, amounting to about 2 billion rubles, will be sent there as well.

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St Petersburg Authorities Curb Nonpayments

954F1420A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 11 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Bekker under the rubric "Pioneers": "Anatoliy Chubays Called for Utilization of the Progressive Experience of His Fellow Citizens: St. Petersburg Fights Intelligently Against Nonpayments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the last meeting of the governmental Commission To Improve Payments and Account Settlements, first vice premier Chubays was most likely very glad to give the floor to a fellow citizen, the first deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, Aleksey Kudrin. The people in Moscow had already heard of their neighbors' experience in resolving the nonpayments crisis. The rate of growth in creditor indebtedness has slowed down, the proportion of tax arrears to budgets has declined, and the volume of overdue indebtedness on payment of capital for wages, pensions, and grants has dropped in recent months there.

Incidentally, the general picture is by no means idyllic: Mr. Kudrin noted that industrial enterprises' account settlements with energy enterprises (a debt of 113 billion rubles [R]) as well as the federal budget's indebtedness to enterprises and St. Petersburg's budget are causing substantial difficulties. At the same time, however, the deputy mayor reported that very soon the city budget will take out a bank credit and pay off its debt to energy workers, which will help reduce the charge for electricity by 15 percent--an incredible fact in present times. It is even more striking that this charge has been the same for industry and budget organizations in the city for 2 years now, which partially reduces the burden on industrial enterprises.

Nonetheless, nonpayments are substantial, and in order to work them out, the St. Petersburg authorities redeemed R56 billion worth of Minfin [Ministry of Finance] treasury bills (TB) from the enterprises and gave them at face value to Lentransgaz [Leningrad Transport Gas], to which the city budget in its turn was indebted, and in part paid them against Lentransgaz's future taxes. The mayor's office thereby instilled trust in state securities among the enterprises, and they began to take TB's more readily. Moreover, the city budget began to rely on Tveruniversalbank [Tver Universal Bank] and Inkombank [Foreign Commercial Bank] promissory notes, which allows the mayor's office to borrow credits from them and pay off the debt to energy workers.

The city authorities are actively pursuing mutual offsetting of debts between the city budget and enterprises and helping the latter "undo" the chains of debts with Russia's mixed enterprises. St. Petersburg's control organs audited 56 banks, found 8,000 cases of delayed transfers to the federal budget worth a total of R10 billion, and collected R200 million in fines "from the offenders."

Mr. Kudrin reproached the government somewhat for the large debt to the Petersburg "defense industry" on the state order, but then found himself under cross examination by the deputy minister of finance Samusev and the GKI [possibly State Committee for Investment] chairman Belyayev. The latter utilized the report by the St. Petersburg commission on nonpayments which states that the federal budget's debt to the city is R313 billion, while the aggregate indebtedness for the city is R4.3 trillion. The difference in the range of figures means that as the central authorities believe, the government's contribution to aggravating the nonpayments crisis is greatly exaggerated. The multiplicative effect, which in Mr. Kudrin's opinion produces the state's debts, was not a sufficient argument, since the state's proportion in growth of nonpayments which this effect accounts for has never been calculated.

The St. Petersburg authorities are issuing a municipal loan for R2 trillion for a term of 2 years in order to continue their effective influence on the situation. The main aim of the loan is to alleviate the seasonal shortage of money in the budget when, for example, in January taxes have not yet been received, and in late summer when substantial capital is needed for the harvest. The second mission of the loan is to settle this year's debts to the budget, in particular on bank credits.

In connection with this, Mr. Kudrin made the proposal that the municipal bonds be tax exempt, as was done with GKO's [state short-term bonds]. Two other initiatives of the St. Petersburg authorities followed. The largest debtor of the city budget is the Oktyabrskiy Railroad, which has R112 billion "hanging over" it. The MPS [Ministry of Railways] must make its subdivision pay with promissory notes. He also proposed to break the nonpayments chain: Komineft [Komi Oil Company] got in debt to the federal budget for about R200 billion, while the federal budget owes roughly the same to the St. Petersburg budget. Mutual offsetting comes to mind given this correlation of debts.

The chairman of the Commission on Nonpayments, Anatoliy Chubays, was noticeably heartened by the activities of his fellow citizens, who did not request different kinds of breaks, as often happens at the commission, but found their own way to fight nonpayments. "If the municipal budget pays off St. Petersburg's enterprises with promissory notes, why not use this system for settling accounts with the federal budget?" the first vice premier suggested and called for utilizing progressive experience.

St Petersburg's Homeless Population Rises

954F1422A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Yuliya Kantor and Yuliya Ivanova: "Look Around and You Will See a Stranger Passing By: 50,000 Homeless on Petersburg Streets"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] According to statistical data, there are 50,000 homeless people in Petersburg. The average age is 40 years. It used to be that Petersburg homeless were largely people who had returned from places "not so very far away." In recent years the number of people who have fallen "to the lower depths" after becoming victims of intrigues in exchanging housing has risen.

According to specialists' prognoses, there are about a million (!) potential homeless in the city, that is to say, people who at any moment might find themselves on the street. They include lonely elderly people, disabled persons, alcoholics, and drug addicts.

Until quite recently, people who did not have residence permits could not obtain even one-time medical aid, much less regular care. That was how it was until the special purpose charitable foundation "Nochlezhka" [flop-house] appeared in Petersburg.

"The foundation exists on the donations of private persons and organizations. Most of the capital comes from foreigners," says Valeriy Sokolov, the president of the "Nochlezhka" charitable foundation. "Petersburgers for the most part contribute old clothing and food. This is the fifth year we have been in existence and many people know that there is help for the homeless on Pushkin Street. Preparations are now underway on an agreement with the mayor's committee on social questions regarding the foundation assuming the duties of providing social assistance to the homeless. Half of this program will probably be financed from the budget."

Our city is revered among the homeless, but by no means because of its beauty. The fact is that it is more peaceful in Petersburg than in other cities. Here, for example, the subject of reinstating criminal responsibility for not having a residence permit is not being discussed, as it is in Moscow. On the other hand, the northern capital with 5 million people, unlike the provinces, allows homeless people to avoid constant police oversight.

A half-starved existence under conditions which are difficult to call human cannot fail to have an effect on a person's health. Tuberculosis is perhaps the most common disease among the homeless. Our consumptive climate combined with the abnormal way of life not only helps spread the disease but helps new forms of it appear. The "Little Red Riding Hood" syndrome is no less common "in the lower depths" than tuberculosis. Usually only a few curious people who saw the body being removed from a basement or attic learn of a homeless person's death. Then a marker with a number instead of a name appears at one of the city's cemeteries.

The special purpose charitable foundation has given Petersburg homeless the opportunity to be treated in the city's hospital wards and obtain directions to tuberculosis treatment centers and decontamination centers (infestations of lice are altogether commonplace for those who inhabit the "lower depths"). "Nochlezhka" operates a shelter for elderly people who wish to enter nursing homes. While they are in the shelter, the associates of the foundation which exists only through donations gather the necessary documents.

Disabled persons and elderly people are a special part of "Nochlezhka's" activity. Those who do not receive a pension are regularly paid a small allowance here. The foundation issues allowances to homeless participants in the blockade who did not receive one for the 50th anniversary of the lifting of the blockade (the mayor's office helped a little here).

"Nochlezhka" is in constant contact with the authorities, we must note. But it is difficult to call these contacts fruitful. Here is a typical example. Two years ago the foundation and the zone's Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Design created a design for a residential shelter. It went through the state expert study and was approved by the mayor's city planning committee. After a long silence, the city administration sent a letter to Moscow, to the Department of Labor, Health Care, and Social Protection. The letter contained the proposal "as an experiment" to finance the construction of the shelter. There has been no response from the capital as yet.

Meanwhile, about 1,000 people apply to "Nochlezhka's" registration and aid-to-the-homeless center every week. Dozens of people are registered and receive medial assistance and legal advice, while hundreds receive a free lunch and clothing.

The foundation publishes the newspaper NA DNE [The Lower Depths], which is unique in its own way. Homeless people contribute to it as well. For many of them, this is their only job. You can subscribe to the newspaper by paying several thousand rubles, but there are not many who wish to. We all have so many problems, we are not in the mood for the homeless. Meanwhile, the "Nochlezhka" foundation, barely making ends meet, has begun a charitable action called "On the Other Side."

In its appeal to Petersburgers the foundation wrote: "Already more than 150,000 people who used to live on the territory of the Chechen Republic have been forced to leave their native homes because of combat operations. Until quite recently we considered the problems of refugees as something remote, beyond the borders of Russia. War is now knocking at our doors and at our hearts. Bombs and mines know no borders or nationalities. And at this time, in our opinion, the most important thing is not to stand aside from this tragedy and not to walk by with our eyes closed, although it is hard for all of us now."

"At this time all inhabitants of Groznyy can be categorized as homeless, since those who had apartments in the center of the city and in the regions of combat operations have lost everything," says Valeriy Sokolov, who returned from Chechnya recently. "Our foundation is

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offering humanitarian aid to Chechnya: clothing, medicines, and foodstuffs. The first 1.5 tonnes of clothing left for there on 31 January. We are poor, but we can certainly help in this situation."

The charitable foundation "Nochlezhka" has undertaken to resolve the problems which must certainly disturb the city government, the mayor's office, the community, and, finally, simple Petersburgers. It is the duty of each one of us to help the foundation to the extent of our abilities and powers.

Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Advocates Agrarian Reform Program

954F1325A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Boris Nemtsov, Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast: "Deal With Agrarian Reform Immediately; the Agrarian Lobby Is Delaying a Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For people who know the history of their native land at all, it is absolutely obvious that the success or failure of economic reforms depends to a gigantic degree on the intensity and consistency of the conducting of land reform. Aleksandr II, by having abolished serfdom in 1861, began the rapid development of capitalism in Russia.

The reforms of Petr Stolypin, despite the stiff resistance of opposition members of the State Duma, yielded dramatic results in a few years. By the efforts of the Stolypin small-holders productivity in the country increased by 14 percent from 1906 through 1915 and by 25 percent in Siberia. In 1914 the Stolypin individual farmers had passed the commune (obshchina) with respect to deliveries of marketable output to the cities and for export. Russia's grain exports in 1912 exceeded the exports of Argentina, Canada and the USA, taken together, by almost 30 percent.

Unfortunately the Russian reform of recent years has essentially not affected land relationships. By no means belittling the significance of the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation—"On Land Reform," "On the Peasant (Individual Farmer) Farm," "The RSFSR Land Code"—and other normative documents which have permitted the putting into shape of a new type of economic management on the land, individual owner farming, I want to note that by virtue of a number of circumstances this has turned out to be manifestly insufficient for the process of creating highly profitable farms to become dynamic and irreversible and, what is very important, determinant of the course of reforms in the economy as a whole. The reason lies in the fact that the original orientation exclusively on individual owner farming was obviously utopian. As a rule, the individual farmers who have left the kolkhozes are poor in material terms and the state's support totally inadequate to put them on their feet.

The highly dramatic situation that has arisen in the village, related primarily to the catastrophic drop in production, diminution of herd productiveness, and a shrinkage in sown areas, can be resolved in two ways:

either, as the communists and the agrarian party demand, to support the system which has developed with the help of enormous subsidies, essentially changing nothing;

or, to find more efficient forms of economic management which, given moderate state support, would permit one to make agricultural production highly profitable and competitive.

The first way—to put it bluntly, the way of ruin, destruction and deindustrialization—sooner or later will bring to power agents who hand out soup and build special reception centers for the discontented. The second way, rather painful but constructive, requires action programs worked out in detail and enormous organizational work.

The program, on the one hand, should not repeat the mistakes of past reforms (the compulsory character, force, propagation of a single method of economic management, land conflicts) and, on the other, cannot be purely cosmetic. The program, undoubtedly, should affect the essence of production relations and property relations. Otherwise nothing will will change.

In my view the main goals of reforms in the village, on which the program ought to be based, should be the following:

the creation of efficient agricultural enterprises based on various methods of labor organization;

support of the peasants with the most initiative;

an increase in labor productivity and labor discipline;

an increase in the competitiveness of agricultural production.

A number of principles need to be observed to achieve the indicated goals:

the voluntary nature of the participation of farms (khozyaystvo) in the reorganization and privatization of the land on the basis of decisions they have made. A given decision should be adopted not by the farm's leadership but by the workers;

freedom of choice, when the new owners themselves determine the organizational and legal form of their newly created enterprises;

honest and open distribution of land and property;

social protection of pensioners and incapacitated citizens living in the rural area.

Proceeding from the goals and principles which have been set forth, a group of scientists of the Agrarian

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Institute of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, together with specialists of the agriculture department of the administration of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation, developed in the course of 1993 a program for the reorganization of kolkhozes and sovkhozes known as the Nizhniy Novgorod model of land reform. I take the liberty of asserting that a more detailed legally and technically worked out program for the reorganization of agricultural enterprises does not exist in Russia. The program in question envisages the creation of new individual farmer farms, partnerships (tovarishchestvo), joint-stock companies and other agricultural enterprises through the distribution of the land and property of existing farms among them. As of today seven agricultural enterprises of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast have been reformed according to this model. Despite the short period of time that has passed since the moment of reorganization, it is already possible to talk about the first positive results.

On 10 March of last year Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin visited one of the auctions in the Gorodetskiy Rayon of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. In the course of his speech to the agrarians he declared that this program would be nation-wide already in the very near future. However, the intense pressure of the agrarian lobby every day puts back the final adoption of a decision regarding the program. And this despite the fact that the basic documents have supposedly already been signed and a Federal Center of Agrarian Reform created.

I am convinced that the time has come for the adoption of a comprehensive program for leading the Russian village out of the crisis. The following ought to be the basic positions of the program:

1. The voluntary reorganization of state collective farms on the basis of the Nizhniy Novgorod model.

2. Lowering of the tax burden for agricultural enterprises. Only the tax on land, the income tax, transfers to the pension fund and other insurance funds should be left.

3. State support of agriculture. The granting of preferential loans for the construction of processing plants, the special purpose allocation of funds for seed production and livestock breeding, and stimulation of reorganization through the granting of long-term loans.

4. Active support at the stage of the sale of output. The direct sale of city stores to specific producers of agricultural products and the construction of a network of new agricultural markets.

5. Training of the personnel of the reorganized farms in market methods of management, book-keeping, and the other disciplines required for our times.

I want to add that the plan of reforms of agriculture presented here has begun to be more or less successfully implemented in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. Unfortunately, a number of positions related primarily to the reduction of taxes and financial support, can be fully implemented only with the realization of the program on the all-Russian level.

It is now becoming absolutely obvious that the tough financial policy proclaimed by the Prime Minister will, without the carrying out of land reform, lead to the bankruptcy of an enormous number of agricultural enterprises which, as a consequence, will become a catalyst for political changes in the country. So that if the government seriously intends to fight inflation, if it wishes the country to get out of the crisis faster, then it will have to immediately deal with land reform. The very near future will indicate whether the present minister of agriculture is capable of decisive actions in this direction.

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